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LEGAL RECOGNITION OF NEOCORTICAL
DEATH
David Randolph Smith t
"[Man] knows death to the bone-
Man has created death."
-William Butler Yeats, Death
All human beings know the fact and reality of death, yet man-
kind's very existence is in many ways a search to understand death.
As Samuel Johnson observed to Boswell, "the whole of life is but
keeping away the thoughts of it."' I Throughout history, theologians,
philosophers, and poets have struggled with the meaning of death.
Saint Augustine asked what type of death God intended to enforce
His commands: "Was it the death of the soul, or of the body, or of
the entire man, or the so-called second death?" 2 Yet for Dylan
Thomas, "[a]fter the first death, there is no other." 3 The law must
also face death, particularly the dilemma created by advances in
medical science that permit the artificial maintenance of heart, lung,
and nourishment functions.
This Article examines the law's approach to death by inquiring
into the legal issues raised by cardiopulmonary, whole brain, and
neocortical definitions of death. The term "cardiopulmonary
death" means the irreversible cessation of heart and lung func-
tions.4 "Whole brain death" means the irreversible cessation of all
Copyright © 1986. David Randolph Smith. All rights reserved.
t Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. B.A. 1975, Harvard Univer-
sity; J.D. 1978, University of Texas.
1 2J. BOSWELL, BOSWELL's LIFE OFJOHNSON 93 (Oxford Univ. Clarendon Press ed.
1934).
2 ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD [De Civitate Dei] 277 (Image Books ed. 1958).
Augustine's next sentence provides a response: "The answer is: every kind of death."
Id.
3 Thomas, A Refusal to Mliourn the Death, by Fire, of a Child in London, in THE NORTON
ANTHOLOGY OF MODERN POETRY 909 (R. Ellmann & R. O'Clair eds. 1973).
4 Cardiopulmonary cessation or the irreversible loss of vital fluid flow (air and
blood) historically has served as the criterion for determination of death. PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DEFINING DEATH, A REPORT ON THE MEDICAL, LEGAL AND ETHI-
CAL ISSUES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH 5 (1981) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION]; Joynt, A New Look at Death, 252 J. A.M.A. 680 (1984). Cardiopulmonary
death is indicated by the absence of pulse and a flat-line electrocardiographic response.
Younger & Bartlett, Human Death and High Technology: The Failure of Whole-Brain Formula-
tions, 99 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 252, 253 (1983).
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functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem.5 "Neocorti-
cal death" means the irreversible loss of consciousness and cogni-
tive functions. 6
Several arguments and a proposal emerge from this examina-
tion of the legal issues raised by definitions of death. The law
should and does define criteria for death. The vast majority of
5 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 32-38; Bernat, Culver & Gert, On
the Definition and Criterion of Death, 94 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 389 (1981); Bernat, Cul-
ver & Gert, Defining Death in Theory and Practice, 12 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5 (1982).
Whole brain death requires a finding of irreversible loss of noncognitive integrating
capacities. Younger & Bartlett, supra note 4, at 253. A diagnosis of whole brain death is
generally made in accordance with one of several sets of criteria: the guidelines for
diagnosis of whole brain death set forth by the President's Commission, Report of the
Medical Consultants on the Diagnosis of Death to the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Guidelines for the Determination of
Death, 246J. A.M.A. 2184 (1981); the National Institutes of Neurological Diseases and
Stroke criteria, An Appraisal of the Criteria of Cerebral Death, A Summary Statement, A Collabora-
tive Study, 237 J. A.M.A. 982 (1977); the British criteria, Conference of the Royal Col-
leges and Faculties of the United Kingdom, Diagnosis of Brain Death, 2 LANCET 1069
(1976); or the Harvard criteria, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School
to Examine the Definition of Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J.'A.M.A. 337
(1968). All of these guidelines include nearly identical clinical points, however, the
guidelines contain some differences as to the duration of observation necessary to estab-
lish the diagnosis as well as the emphasis to be placed upon laboratory diagnosis proce-
dures such as the electroencephalogram. See F. PLUM &J. POSNER, supra note 4, at 314-
23; Walker, Current Concepts of Brain Death, 15 J. NEUROSURGICAL NURSING 261, 263
(1983) ("In the past twenty years, a number of sets of criteria have been formulated for
the determination of cerebral death. Of the earlier ones, the Harvard criteria were the
best known. However, these guidelines have been found to be unnecessarily
restrictive.").
6 The term "neocortical death" defines a clinical condition in which the critical
elements of the central nervous system have been destroyed, leaving the patient in an
irreversible unconscious condition. Neocortical death "occurs when the brain damage is
permanent and sufficiently severe that the individual is thereafter unable to maintain
homeostasis (i.e., gives no self-awareness and is unable to respond behaviorally in any
major or appropriate way to the environment), even though the brain stem may con-
tinue to maintain internal (vegetative) homeostasis." F. PLUM &J. POSNER, THE DIAGNO-
SIS OF STUPOR AND COMA 313 (3d ed. 1982). "Neocortical death" embraces the terms
"persistent vegetative state," "noncognitive state," "apallic syndrome," "cerebral
death" (irreversible destruction of both cerebral hemispheres), and "irreversible lesions
of the mid-brain reticular formation." See Ingvar, Brun, Johansson & Samuelsson, Sur-
vival After Severe Cerebral Anoxia with Destruction of the Cerebral Cortex: The Apallic Syndrome,
315 ANNALS OF N.Y. ACAD. OF SCI. 184-85 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Ingvar]; Korein,
Terminology, Definitions, and Usage, 315 ANNALS OF N.Y. ACAD. OF Scl. 6-10 (1978);
Ladanyi, Residual Sentience and Cognitive Death: Ethical Issues in Brain Death and the Persistent
Vegetative State, 131 CANADIAN MED. Assoc. J. 632, 634-35 (1984); J. Posner, Coma and
Other States of Consciousness: The Differential Diagnosis of Brain Death, 315 ANNALS OF N.Y.
ACAD. OF Sci. 215-27 (1978).
The state of residual sentience known as the "locked-in syndrome," in which pa-
tients suffer paralysis of all four extremities and the lower cranial nerves yet retain con-
sciousness, is not included within the definition of neocortical death. F. PLUM & J.
POSNER, supra at 6. See also Meinenberg, Mumenthaler & Karbowski, Quadriparesis and
Nuclear Oculomotor Palsy With Total Bilateral Ptosis Mimicking Coma: A Mesencephalic 'Locked-
In Syndrome'?, 36 ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY 708 (1979).
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states either by statute or judicial decision now supplement the
cardiopulmonary test for death with a whole brain death standard. 7
Although widely accepted, the whole brain definition of death is it-
self mortal-a creation of prevailing medical technologies and a
conservative death orthodoxy. This Article advances the legal anal-
ysis of death by arguing that neocortical death should be considered
the death of the person for all legal purposes.8 Law and medicine
now give de facto recognition to the validity of the neocortical defi-
nition of death by allowing private decisions to withhold or termi-
nate treatment and nourishment of irreversibly noncognitive
patients in a persistent vegetative state. Moreover, recent state-of-
the-art medical developments in positron emission tomography
(PET) scanning permit accurate diagnosis of neocortical death,
thereby facilitating the inclusion of neocortical death within the
legal definition of death. Although irreversible loss of conscious-
ness and cerebration should establish legal death, the deceased (by
a prior written directive) or the family of the deceased should have
the option of maintaining biological existence, subject to the finan-
cial ability of the estate or family to shoulder the costs of biological
maintenance.
I
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WHOLE BRAIN
DEFINITION OF DEATH
Death triggers important legal consequences. A determination
of death ends marriage and business partnerships, begins the pro-
cess of disposing of a deceased's property, and may signal the obli-
gation of a life insurance company to pay death benefits 9 or a
hospital's right to remove the deceased's donated organs for trans-
plantation.10 Criminal liability for homicide depends upon the
death of a person. Given the significance of death as a condition
precedent to a wide array of legal rights and results, one would
think it desirable for law and medicine to formulate a precise con-
ception of when death occurs and what the term "death" means.
Until recently, however, the law did not undertake to define death in
terms that take into account the new developments in artificial life-
support systems and organ transplants.
For example, suppose D shoots V in the head. V is rushed to
the hospital, placed on a respirator, and administered medication to
7 See infra notes 14-15.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 40-160.
9 See, e.g., Thornton & Staff, Death and the Life Iysumance Policy: What Hath .lodeni
Medicine Wrought, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 285, 290-91 (1983).
10 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 23.
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maintain blood pressure. The next morning, a neurologist exam-
ines V and finds an irreversible cessation of all function of Vs entire
brain. With the consent of Vs legal guardian, physicians remove Vs
organs for transplantation purposes. The respirator is then discon-
nected, and Vs breathing and heartbeat stop. Has D committed
homicide? Were the medical procedures performed by the physi-
cians a superseding cause of death?
The New York Court of Appeals faced these facts and issues in
People v. Eulo." I The defendants argued that even if they were guilty
of shooting the victim in the head, they could not be guilty of mur-
der because they had not caused the death of the victim. The de-
fendants alleged that under New York law the court should have
charged the jury on the cardiopulmonary definition of death. The
court rejected these contentions, holding that the defendants were
guilty of murder because whole brain death could properly be in-
cluded within the legal definition of death. The court found that
death occurs either upon a medical finding of cardiopulmonary
death, or, when a determination that cardiopulmonary functions
have ceased is not possible because artificial means of support are in
use, upon a medical finding that the patient is whole brain dead.1 2
Eulo is a recent example of the law's growing need to resolve the
conflict between the conventional view of death as the irreversible
cessation of heart and lung functioning and the medical commu-
nity's growing reliance and acceptance of brain death criteria. 13 A
substantial number of cases explicitly or implicitly recognize a whole
brain death definition when application of the traditional cardi-
opulmonary standards would produce unjust results.
In response to the nagging uncertainties caused by the develop-
ment of sophisticated life-support technologies, the law now ex-
pressly acknowledges whole brain death as a definition for death.
Thirty-three states and the District of Columbia have enacted stat-
utes that incorporate whole brain death into their definitions of
death. 14 Courts in seven other states have adopted a whole brain
11 63 N.Y.2d 341, 472 N.E.2d 286, 482 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1984).
12 Id. at 357-58, 472 N.E.2d at 296, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 446.
13 For earlier examples, see In re Estate of Schmidt, 261 Cal. App. 2d 262, 273, 67
Cal. Rptr. 847, 854 (1968); Schmitt v. Pierce, 344 S.W.2d 120, 133 (Mo. 1961); Smith v.
Smith, 229 Ark. 579, 586, 317 S.W.2d 275, 279 (1958); Vieth, Brain Death and Organ
Transplantation, 315 ANNALS OF N.Y. ACAD. OF Sci. 417, 426-28 (1978). See also Ufford,
Brain Death/Termination of Heroic Efforts to Save Life-Who Decides?, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 225,
230 (1980).
14 ALA. CODE §§ 22-31-1 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.120 (1983); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§§ 82-537 to 82-538 (1976 & Supp. 1985); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7180-7183
(West 1970 & Supp. 1986); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36-136 (1977 & Supp. 1985); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-278(b) & (c) (West 1985 Special Pamphlet) (part of Uniform Ana-
tomical Gift Act, 8A U.L.A. 15 (1975)); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2401 (1982); FLA. STAT.
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death definition, some for all contexts and some for the limited pur-
pose of establishing death under homicide laws. 15 No reported case
has rejected the whole brain death definition when the issue has
been raised.16
Six of the forty states that have updated legal definitions of
death define death by sole or primary reliance on a whole brain
death standard as determined by accepted methods of medical prac-
tice. 17 The Uniform Determination of Death Act adopts an alterna-
tive test:' 8 either the cardiopulmonary or the whole brain
§ 382.085 (Supp. Pamphlet 1974-1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-1716 (1979 & Supp.
1984); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 327 C-1 (1976 & Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 54-1819
(1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I 10 1/2 § 302 (Smith-Hurd 1978) (part of Uniform Anatomi-
cal Gift Act, 8A U.L.A. 15 (1975)); IOWA CODE ANN. § 702.8 (West 1976); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 77-205 (1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:111 (1965 & Supp. 1986); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2811-2813 (1964 & Supp. 1985); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 5-201
to 202 (1982 & Supp. 1985); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.15 (1021-1023) (Callaghan 1980 &
Supp. 1985); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-36-3 (1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-22-101
(1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 451.007 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-4 (1978); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 90-323 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.30 (Page 1976 & Supp. 1984);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-301(g) (West 1975); OR. REV. STAT. § 146.001 (1984); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 10201 to 10203 (Purdon 1984 Supp.); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4-16
(1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-501 (1982); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4447t
(Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5218 (1968 & Supp. 1985); VA.
CODE § 54-325.7 (1982 & Supp. 1985); W. VA. CODE § 16-10-1 to 16-10-3 (1985); Wis.
STAT. § 146.71 (Supp. 1985); Wyo. STAT. § 35-19-101 (Supp. 1985).
15 State v. Fierro, 124 Ariz. 182, 185-86, 603 P.2d 74, 77-78 (1979) (homicide);
Swafford v. State, 421 N.E.2d 596, 602 (Ind. 1981) (homicide); Commonwealth v. Gol-
ston, 373 Mass. 249, 253-55, 366 N.E.2d 744, 744-49 (1977) (homicide), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1039 (1978); State v. Meints, 212 Neb. 410, 419-20, 322 N.W.2d 809, 814 (1982)
(homicide); State v. Watson, 191 NJ. Super. 464, 466, 467 A.2d 590, 591 (1983) (homi-
cide); People v. Eulo, 63 N.Y.2d 341, 357-58, 472 N.E.2d 286, 296, 482 N.Y.S.2d 436,
446 (1984) (generally); In re Bowman, 94 Wash. 2d 407, 421, 617 P.2d 731, 738 (1980)
(generally). The Colorado legislature adopted a whole brain death definition, COLO.
REV. STAT. § 12-36-36 (1977 & Supp. 1985), after the Colorado Supreme Court recog-
nized whole brain death in Lovato v. District Court, 198 Colo. 419, 433, 601 P.2d 1072,
1081 (1979). Illinois adopted whole brain death as a legal definition of death in In re
Haymer, 115 Ill. App. 3d 349, 355, 450 N.E.2d 940, 945 (1983). The court viewed the
whole brain death definition set out in Illinois's version of the Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 302 (1978), as limited to that particular statute. 115
Ill. App. 3d at 355, 450 N.E.2d at 943.
16 In re Haymer, 115 Ill. App. 3d 349, 355, 450 N.E.2d 940, 943 (1983); A.
MORACZEWSKI &J. SHOWALTER, DETERMINATION OF DEATH 30 (1982).
17 Statutes in Arkansas, Connecticut (as part of its formulation of the Uniform Ana-
tomical Gift Act), Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and West Virginia take this ap-
proach. See supra note 14. The Unif. Brain Death Act § 1, 12 U.L.A. 17 (Supp. 1985),
recommended in 1978 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws also employs a singular whole brain focus: "For legal and medical purposes, an
individual who has sustained irreversible cessation of all functioning of the brain, includ-
ing the brain stem, is dead. A determination under this section must be made in accord-
ance with reasonable medical standards." Similarly, the Law Reform Commission of
Canada proposed a statute that makes the irreversible cessation of all brain functions the
sole definition of death. LAw REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, CRITERIA FOR THE DE-
TERMINATION OF DEATH (1981).
18 The Unif. Determination of Death Act § 1, 12 U.L.A. 271 (Supp. 1985), provides:
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definition. Twenty-six states and the District of Columbia have ac-
cepted this approach.' 9 Eight states retain the cardiopulmonary
definition with the additional provision that when artificial means of
sustaining respiration and heartbeat preclude application of the
cardiopulmonary standard, a finding of whole brain death will suf-
fice.20 Numerous groups, including the American Bar Association,
the American Medical Association, the American Academy of Neu-
rology, the American Electroencephalographic Society, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and the Pres-
ident's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (hereinafter "President's
Commission") have endorsed the Uniform Determination of Death
Act's cardiopulmonary or whole brain based criteria. 2 1 Despite the
lack of universal acceptance of a single definition of deatli, law,
medicine, and society at large have reached a consensus on the ap-
propriateness of defining the death of the person to include the ces-
sation of all functions of the whole brain.
Although some commentators have argued to the contrary,22
"An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and re-
spiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, in-
cluding the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must be made in accordance
with accepted medical standards."
19 Statutes of this type are in force in California, Colorado, The District of Colum-
bia, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
States that have judicially recognized an alternative definition based upon either whole
brain or cardiopulmonary criteria are Arizona, Illinois, Indiana, Nebraska, New Jersey,
Massachusetts, and Washington. See supra note 14.
20 Alabama, Alaska, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, New York, and Texas apply
this formulation, first advanced by Capron & Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Standards for
Determining Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 87 (1972). See
supra note 14.
21 A. MORACZEWSKI &J. SHOWALTER, supra note 16, at 27-28.
22 See Dworkin, Death in Context, 48 IND. LJ. 623 (1973). Professor Dworkin argues
that the determination of death must be made in the context of the particular case by
determining whether treating the person as legally dead "seems [to be] the best thing to
do." Id. at 636. He summarizes his position as follows:
[M]odern writers on death have failed to ask the most basic question
about the death definition problem: What difference does it make
whether somebody is dead? That question places the issue of death into
the only posture in which it can be of relevance to the law-the posture of
context or consequences. Whatever may be the needs of the philosopher
or the ethicist, the lawyer needs only to know what consequences follow
upon a given determination. Only if we are persuaded that one definition
of death will always lead to the correct resolution of legal problems do we
need to search for such a definition.
Id. at 628-29 (emphasis in original).
This "contextual" approach to death has not gained acceptance. Forty states and
the District of Columbia have adopted uniform definitions of death that include whole
brain death. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text. The President's Commission
has recommended that the states move toward a uniform definition of death. PRESI-
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defining death, and including brain-based criteria within the defini-
tion, offers several advantages. The President's Commission points
out that a uniform definition will enhance ease and efficiency in
transplanting donated organs. Removing vital organs from a whole
brain dead donor within the limited time frame in which the donor's
heart and lungs continue to function materially improves the recipi-
ent's chances for a successful transplant. 23 The President's Com-
mission noted, however, that the concern over the determination of
death rests less with any wish to facilitate organ transplantation than
with the need both to render appropriate care to patients, and to
replace artificial support with more fitting and respectful behavior
when a patient has become a dead body.24 A brain death standard
also defeats the arguments advanced by criminal defendants that a
physician's performance of a transplant breaks the chain of causa-
tion, thereby relieving the defendant of liability for homicide.25
II
BEYOND WHOLE BRAIN DEATH: NEOCORTICAL DEATH
Although the whole brain definition of death prevails today, law
and medicine must move forward to recognize a higher brain-ne-
ocortical formulation of death.26 The balance of this Article ad-
DENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 51. In addition, a recently appointed federal Task
Force on Organ Transplantation has recommended the passage of brain death laws in
the states that have not yet recognized brain death. See Legislation to Spur Organ Donations
Urged, Am. Med. News, Oct. 18, 1985, at 24, col. 1.
23 See Schwartz, Bioethical and Legal Considerations in Increasing the Supply of Transplant-
able Organs: From UAGA to "Baby Fae," 10 AM. J. LAw & MED. 397, 399 (1985).
24 PRESIDEr'S COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 23-24.
25 The Law and Medicine Committee of the American Bar Association notes other
advantages:
This Committee states that the advantages of its simple direct definition
are that it: permits judicial determination of the ultimate fact of death;
permits medical determination of the evidentiary fact of death; avoids
religious determination of any facts; avoids prescribing the medical crite-
ria; enhances changing medical criteria; enhances local medicine practice
tests; covers the three known tests ("brain, beat and breath tests"); covers
death as a process (medical preference); covers death as a point in time
(legal preference); avoids passive euthanasia; avoids active euthanasia;
covers current American and European medical practices; covers both
civil and criminal law; covers current American judicial decisions; avoids
nonphysical sciences.
Veith, Brain Death and Organ Transplantation, 315 ANNALS OF N.Y. ACAD. OF ScI. 416, 430
(1978).
26 As one court observed:
Now, however, we are on the threshold of new terrain-the penumbra
where death begins but life, in some form, continues. We have been led
to it by the medical miracles which now compel us to distinguish between
"death," as we have known it, and death in which the body lives in some
fashion but the brain (or a significant part of it) does not.
Severns v. Wilmington Med. Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1980). Dr. A. Earl
856 [Vol. 71:850
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dresses why the consensus favoring the whole brain definition must
ultimately erode and then considers the implications of recognizing
neocortical death as legal death.
A person may suffer an irreversible loss of consciousness and
cognition, the earmarks of higher brain activity, without losing brain
stem functions. 27 Under a neocortical definition, a patient in this
noncognitive persistent vegetative state is dead.28 The patient
would not be considered dead under a whole brain death standard
because the brain stem, the portion of the lower brain that regulates
vegetative functions such as breathing, blood pressure, tempera-
ture, and neuroendocrine control, would continue to function.29
For example, victims of cardiac or respiratory arrest, asphyxiation,
stroke, or head trauma may become neocortically dead but not
whole brain dead. This condition can occur when deprivation of
circulatory or respiratory functions occurs for a period of time brief
enough to spare the brain stem but long enough to cause perma-
nent damage to the cerebrum. 30 Vegetative patients who are ne-
ocortically dead can remain biologically alive with intravenous
feeding and antibiotics for much longer periods of time than pa-
Walker, a renowned neurosurgeon, notes: "After the concept of brain death has been
introduced and generally accepted, the question was raised in philosophical and medical
discussions as to whether the lack of function of an essential part of the central nervous
system might not be considered as death. . . . These philosophical issues may become
the medical problems of the future. Obviously the concept of brain death has opened a
Pandora's box that will trouble mankind for a long time." Walker, supra note 5, at 261.
See also Tomlinson, The Conservative Use of the Brain-Death Criterion-A Critique, 9J. MED. &
PHIL. 377, 389 (1984); Walker, Dead or Alive, 172 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 639
(1984).
27 See Dougherty, Rawlinson, Levy & Plum, Hypoxia-Ischemic Brain Injury and the Vege-
tative State: Clinical and Neuropathologic Correlation, 31 NEUROLOGY 991 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Dougherty]; Ingvar, supra note 6; Ladanyi, supra note 6.
28 See supra note 6.
29 See supra note 5.
30 See Levy, Caronna, Singer, Lapinski, Frydman & Plum, Predicting Outcome From
Hypoxic-Ischemic Coma, 253J. A.M.A. 1420 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Levy]; Levy, Bates,
Caronna, Cartlidge, Knill-Jones, Lapinski, Singer, Shaw & Plum, Prognosis in Nontraumatic
Coma, 94 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 293 (1981); Cranford & Smith, Some Critical Distinc-
tions Between Brain Death and Persistent Vegetative State, 6 ETHICS SCI. & MED. 199-209
(1979); Dougherty, supra note 27 (dissemination of training in cardiopulmonary resusci-
tation may be increasing incidence of persistent vegetative state relative to incidences of
whole brain and cardiopulmonary death); Pampiglione, Chaloner, Harden & O'Brien,
Transitory Ischemia/Anoxia in Young Children and the Prediction of Quality of Survival, 315 AN-
NALS OF N.Y. ACAD. OF Sci. 281, 283-84 (1978).
An estimated 10,000 patients in the United States are neocortically dead but are
being kept biologically alive by artificial means. Am. Med. News, Mar. 28, 1986, at 1,
col. 1; Goodman, When the Choice Is Irreversible Coma or Turning Off the Feeding Tube, Boston
Globe, June 13, 1985, at 27; Mancusi, Karen Ann Quinlan's Legacy: Questions On Dying That
Have Yet to be Answered, Boston Globe, June 13, 1985, at 3. A 1978 study estimated that in
Japan 2,000 to 3,000 permanently vegetative patients were being cared for out of a pop-
ulation of 100 million persons. Sato, Ueki, Arai, Epidemiological Survey of Vegetative Patients
in Tokohu District ofJapan, 8 NEUROLOGIA MEDICO-CHIRURGICA (Tokyo) 141-45 (1978).
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tients who have sustained whole brain death.3 1 Although heart and
lung functions typically cease within hours or a few days after whole
brain death,32 cardiopulmonary activities can continue for many
years in neocortically dead patients. 33 Karen Ann Quinlan's situa-
tion is the most familiar example of this phenomenon. 34
Neocortical death destroys critical elements of the central ner-
vous system, leaving the person in an irreversible condition without
awareness, thought, or feelings.35 Deprived of higher brain func-
tions, the patient does not purposefully react to external stimuli.3 6
A patient may yawn, sigh, react to light, breathe, and maintain a
heartbeat. These responses are, however, merely physiologic re-
flexes. 37 As Younger and Bartlett concluded: "Despite the contin-
ued ability to spontaneously integrate vegetative functions, a patient
who has irreversibly lost the capacity for consciousness and cogni-
tion is dead. What remains alive is only a mindless organism. ' ' 38
Many medical ethics commentators agree that patients who experi-
ence neocortical death and fall into a persistent vegetative state
should be treated as brain dead. 39
31 See Ingvar, supra note 6, at 196-97. See also Guinness Book of World Records 35 (N.
McWhirter ed. 1984) ("The longest recorded coma was that of Elaine Esposito (b. Dec.
3, 1934) of Tarpon Springs, Fla. She never stirred after an appendectomy on Aug. 6,
1941, when she was six, in Chicago. She died Nov. 25, 1978, aged 43 years 357 days,
having been in a coma for 37 years 111 days.").
32 Black, Brain Death, 299 NEw ENG. J. MED. 338-44 (1978); Ingvar, supra note 6.
33 See supra note 31.
34 In 1975 Karen Ann Quinlan lapsed into an irreversible persistent vegetative
state. On June 11, 1985, Ms. Quinlan was pronounced dead after cessation of heart and
lung functions. See Quinlan Case, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1985, at 24, col. 1.
35 F. PLUM &J. POSNER, supra note 6; Korein, supra note 6, at 8; Younger & Bartlett,
supra note 4, at 256.
36 Korein, supra note 6, at 8.
37 Younger & Bartlett, supra note 4, at 256.
38 Id. See Goodman, supra note 30, at 27:
The million dollar courtroom drama had finally closed. The jet-setting
Dane, the raven-haired mistress, the German-born maid, the vengeful
stepchildren, had taken their curtain calls.
Life had changed for all the cast members of the von Bilow play
except for one: Sunny. She spent the day after her husband's acquittal
like all others in the half-life of irreversible coma. She lay in a bed behind
the guarded door of the $725-a-day room in Columbia Presbyterian Hos-
pital in New York City.
For the 1,632nd day she did not see anything or hear anything or feel
anything or taste anything. The physical therapist came in to exercise her
limbs and to turn her from one side to the other to prevent bedsores.
Her hair was combed, makeup applied, teeth brushed. Her 80-pound
body was fed through a tube.
39 See Fletcher, New Definitions of Death, PRISM (1974); Gert, Personal Identity and the
Body, 10 DIALOGUE 458 (1971); R. VEATCH, DEATH, DYING AND THE BIOLOGICAL REVOLU-
TION: OUR LAST QUEST FOR RESPONSIBILITY 71-75 (1976); Engelhardt, ledicine and the
Concept of Person, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS 94 (T. Beauchamp & L. Walters
eds. 1982); Engelhardt, Defining Death: A Philosophical Problem for Medicine and Law, 112
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A neocortical death formulation hinges on the centrality of con-
sciousness and cognition as the quintessential attributes of human
life. Jacob Bronowski's elegant study, The Ascent of Man,4 expresses
the concept from the standpoint of a scientist and humanist:
Man is a singular creature. He has a set of gifts which make him
unique among the animals: so that, unlike them, he is not a figure
in the landscape-he is a shaper of the landscape ...
• ..Among the multitude of animals which scamper, fly, bur-
row and swim around us, man is the only one who is not locked
into his environment. His imagination, his reason, his emotional
subtlety and toughness, make it possible for him not to accept the
environment but to change it ...
.. .Man is distinguished from other animals by his imagina-
tive gifts. He makes plans, inventions, new discoveries, by putting
different talents together; and his discoveries become more subtle
and penetrating ....
• . .How did the hominids come to be. . .dexterous, obser-
vant, thoughtful, passionate, able to manipulate in the mind the
symbols of language and mathematics both, the visions of art and
geometry and poetry and science?4 1
Pascal's metaphor of a man as a roseau pensant, a thinking reed, is
perhaps the most vivid articulation of the cerebral quality of human
life: "Man is a reed, a bit of straw, the feeblest thing in nature. But
he thinks. His is a thinking reed . . . .Man's dignity, our dignity,
lives in our thoughts. Thereby we rise. Only thereby. . .A think-
ing reed. Not in space am I to seek my dignity. But in my
thinking." 42
AM. REV. RESPIRATORY DISEASE 587 (1975); Green & WikIer, Brain Death and Personal
Identity, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 105, 131 (1980); Olinger, Medical Death, 27 BAYLOR L. REV.
22, 24 (1975); Puccetti, The Conquest of Death, 59 THE MONIST 252 (1976); Rosenfeld, The
Heart, the Head and the Halakah, 70 N.Y. ST.J. MED. 2615 (1970); Veatch, The Whole-Brain-
Oriented Concept of Death: An Outmoded Philosophical Formulation, 3 J. THANATOLOGY 13
(1975); Younger & Bartlett, supra note 4; Redefining Death: Technology and Transplants Com-
plicate Life's Final Certainty, Washington Post, Nov. 20, 1985, at 7, col. 1. But see D. LAMB,
DEATH, BRAIN DEATH, AND ETHICS 45 (1985).
40 J. BRONOWSKI, THE ASCENT OF MAN (1973).
41 Id. at 19-30.
42 B. PASCAL, PENSfES (1965) (Nos. 349 & 348). See also ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN
ETHICS 265 (1962) ("Now, in the case of animals, life is defined by their capacity for
sense perception, and in the case of man by the capacity for sense perception or for
thought. But a capacity is traced back to its corresponding activity, and it is activity that
counts. Consequently, life in the true sense is perceiving or thinking."); R. DESCARTES,
DISCOURSE ON METHOD 28 (1910) ("I think, therefore I am." [Cogito e'go sum]); Rabin &
Rabin, Credo for Creeping Paralysis: Cogito Ergo Sum, in To PROVIDE SAFE PASSAGE: THE
HUMANISTIC ASPECTS OF MEDICINE 48, 52 (P. Rabin & D. Rabin eds. 1985) ("Victims of
ALS [amyotrophic lateral sclerosis] can take heart in the motto cogito ergo sum .... "); L.
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If neocortical functions-the capacity to think, feel, communi-
cate, or experience our environment-are the key to human life,
then the loss of neocortical functions should be the key to human
death. If the irreversible loss of an organism's essentially significant
attributes characterizes death, and if in humans the significant at-
tributes are the capacity for consciousness and higher cortical func-
tions rather than for autonomic bodily integration, then people who
have irreversibly lost these distinguishing features of human life
should be treated as dead. 43 The late Senator Jacob Javits, while
suffering from a terminal illness, agreed: "Because medical technol-
ogy can now sustain life even when the ability to think is gone, soci-
ety must change its laws." 4 4
Biological existence following neocortical death raises several
problems for law and medicine. Perhaps the most troubling ques-
tion raised in cases involving patients who have lost higher brain
functions is whether withdrawing artificial life-support (respirator
and drug therapy regimes) and feeding (intravenous or nasogastric
nourishment) is justified. A growing number of cases45 and stat-
utes46 now permit withholding or completely withdrawing life-sus-
taining treatment and, more recently, nourishment, from patients
who have irreversibly lost all cognitive functions. In a landmark
statement of policy, on March 15, 1986, the American Medical Asso-
ciation's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs unanimously ap-
proved a new ethics principle that authorizes physicians to withhold
or withdraw all means of life-prolonging treatment, including food
and water, from terminal or irreversibly comatose patients, even
when death is not imminent.47 By permitting the dispensation of
CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 14 (Oxford 1982) (After consuming the
bottle labeled "DRINK ME" and shrinking to a height of ten inches, Alice contemplates
her fate: "[S]he waited for a few minutes to see if she was going to shrink any further:
she felt a little nervous about this; 'for it might end, you know,' said Alice, (in my going
out altogether, like a candle. I wonder what I should be like then?' And she tried to
fancy what the flame of a candle is like after it is blown out, for she could not remember
ever having seen such a thing."). In a sense Carroll's simile expresses the essence of
what occurs when a human being forever loses the ability to think: the candle is blown
out. Interestingly, Carroll repeats this idea in a more direct reference to death when
Tweedledum tells Alice that she is only a character in the Red King's dream and "[i]f
that there King was to wake. . . you'd go out-bang!-just like a candle!" L. CARROLL,
THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 168 (Oxford 1982).
43 Veatch, The Definition of Death: Ethical, Philosophical, and Policy Confusion, 315 AN-
NALS OF N.Y. ACAD. OF Sci. 307, 312-13 (1978).
44 Former Senator Pleads For Dignified Death, Am. Med. News, Oct. 25, 1985, at 13, col.
2. "[Javits] believes that a 'test' of an individual's mind should be the deciding factor.
'The more I thought about a test [of mental competence] the more I believed it had
worth for serious consideration.'" Id. at 14, col. 4.
45 See infra notes 48-82 and accompanying text.
46 See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
47 See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
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biological death to irreversibly noncognitive patients, these authori-
ties and developments raise the question of the appropriateness of
accepting a new legal definition of death based on a patient's irre-
versible loss of consciousness and cognitive functions.
The Quinlan case 48 and its progeny49 recognize that an incom-
petent patient has a right of privacy which may be exercised by sub-
stitute decisionmakers. This right to privacy includes the right to
terminate or refuse life-sustaining care. Although the right to pri-
vacy/right to die rationale originated in cases involving irreversibly
noncognitive patients, the rationale has been extended to terminally
ill, old, and mentally impaired patients. 50 This Article deals with the
proper approach to death and only peripherally with the separate
question of withdrawal or refusal of treatment in cases involving
persons who are conscious and cognitive but terminally ill and per-
haps elderly or retarded.5 1 Giving legal recognition to neocortical
48 In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
49 E.g., Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 133, 482 A.2d
713, 720 (Super. Ct. 1984); Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334,
1347 (Del. 1980);John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921,
924 (Fla. 1984); In re P.V.W., 424 So. 2d 1015, 1020 (La. 1982); In re Spring, 380 Mass.
629, 633-34, 405 N.E.2d 115, 119 (1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State School
v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 740-45, 370 N.E.2d 417, 823-25 (1977); In re Torres, 357
N.W.2d 332, 329-40 (Minn. 1984); In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 356-60, 486 A.2d 1209,
1227-29 (1985); Eichnor v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 458-59, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 539
(1980), a ff'dsub nom. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 376-77, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70-71, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266, 272-73, cert. denied sub nom. Storar v. Storar, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); Leach v.
Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 7-9, 426 N.E.2d 809, 812-13 (C.P. 1980);
In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 119-22, 660 P.2d 738, 741-43 (1983).
50 See, e.g., In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980) (family allowed to
terminate life-sustaining hemodialysis treatment being administered to 78-year-old pa-
tient who, although conscious and capable of limited cognitive functions, suffered from
senility); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370
N.E.2d 417 (1977) (court approved guardian's decision to withhold chemotherapy treat-
ment from 67-year-old incompetent patient with I.Q. of 10 and mental age of approxi-
mately two years and eight months who suffered from acute leukemia); In re Hier, 18
Mass. App. Ct. 200, 464 N.E.2d 959 (upholding probate judge's determination of substi-
tuted judgment that seriously ill 92-year-old incompetent person with history of mental
illness would, if competent, decline surgical procedures necessary for reinsertion of
feeding tube), appeal denied, 392 Mass. 1102, 465 N.E.2d 261 (1984).
51 Some critics have suggested that treating irreversibly noncognitive patients as
dead is the first step on a "slippery slope" that will eventually justify active euthanasia or
abortion. See, e.g., D. LAMB, supra note 39, at 42-43; PRESxDENr's COMMISSION, supra note
4, at 40; Beresford, Cognitive Death: Differential Problems and Legal Overtones, 315 ANNALS OF
N.Y. ACAD. OF Sci. 339, 340-41 (1978). This argument is incorrect and misleading. Pa-
tients with severely impaired cognitive abilities, e.g., Alzheimer's disease, nevertheless
retain consciousness and have the capacity to think or listen to Mozart. A person with
dementia or an unborn fetus possesses the potential capacity to think and, therefore, is
not dead. St. Thomas Aquinas noted the importance of this concept in his Summa Theo-
logiae: "Every kind of being is divided into potentiality and act .... Now it is noticeable
that whatever has a soul is not always actual in the sense of vitally acting; so in the soul's
definition it is said that it is the act of a body having life potentialitv.... " ST. THOMAS
AQuINAS, AN AQUINAS READER 215-16 (Image 1972). Thus, rather than undermine the
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death, however, could advance the analysis of the sensitive issue of
forgoing or withdrawing nourishment and artificial life-support sys-
tems in cases involving incompetent terminally ill patients (infants
and adults) who nevertheless retain cognitive functions by forcing
physicians and families to focus on the distinction between patients
who are conscious and alive, and patients who are irreversibly
noncognitive and, therefore, dead.
The case for redefining death becomes compelling when one
examines the logic and results of the right to privacy/right to die
cases. In Barber v. Superior Court, 52 a California Court of Appeals is-
sued a writ of prohibition to bar the prosecution of two physicians
charged with murder for discontinuing life-support equipment and
intravenous feeding of an irreversibly noncognitive adult patient.53
The court held that the physicians' withdrawal of further treatment
at the written request of the patient's wife was not unlawful even
though the physicians knew that their intentional omission would
result in the death of the patient.54 Barber's importance lies in the
court's refusal to apply homicide laws to the intentionally caused
death of a patient who, although neocortically dead, was a living
person under whole brain death law.
In In re Conroy 55 the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that an
incompetent, yet cognitive, institutionalized, eighty-four year old
patient with severe and permanent mental and physical impairments
and a life expectancy of approximately one year could be discon-
nected from all life-sustaining treatment and nourishment (nasogas-
tric feeding tube) if the patient would have desired such a decision.
Conroy is significant for two reasons. First, in approving cessation of
nourishment, the court equated nasal tube feeding to artificial
personhood status of the senile, severely sick or unborn, a neocortical approach to death
strengthens the case for human rights in these settings by stressing consciousness and
the capacity for thinking as the essential test for dispensing or defining death. By con-
trast, alternative formulations that focus on other values such as privacy, quality of life,
or the perceived best interests of the patient do not prevent patients (or the unborn)
from being put to death even though there may be the presence or potential for con-
sciousness. Recognizing neocortical death does not, however, rule out terminating or
withdrawing care from patients who retain consciousness and limited cognitive func-
tions. With legal death properly defined to include neocortical death, medical deci-
sionmakers can directly face the distinct issue of withholding or terminating life-saving
measures from patients who are alive and sapient but afflicted by terminal illness,
chronic pain, extremely diminished cognitive abilities, or a limited life expectancy.
52 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
53 The court described the issue presented: "We deal here with the physician's
responsibility in a case of a patient who, though not 'brain dead,' faces an indefinite
vegetative existence without any of the higher cognitive brain functions." Id. at 1013,
195 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
54 Id. at 1021-22, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
55 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
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breathing induced by a respirator. 56 The court rejected any distinc-
tion between actively hastening death by terminating treatment and
passively allowing a person to die of disease. Second, the court au-
thorized termination of all life-support measures for a terminally ill
patient who retained consciousness and limited cognitive func-
tions57 and was, therefore, not dead under whole brain or neocorti-
cal standards.
The court reversed an appeals court ruling58 that had denied
termination on the ground that the right to terminate life-sustaining
treatment on the basis of a guardian's judgment was limited to in-
curable and terminally ill patients who were whole brain dead or
neocortically dead and who would gain no medical benefit from
continued treatment. 59 Finding a common law right of privacy and
self-determination to decline or terminate medical procedures for
both competent and incompetent patients, the NewJersey Supreme
Court ruled that incompetent patients should have the right to dis-
continue life-support and feeding regimens.60 According to the
court, the guardians must seek to determine whether the incompe-
tent patient would have desired termination on the basis of one of
three standards: subjective (clear evidence that the patient would
have refused treatment under the circumstances involved, e.g., liv-
ing will or oral statements); limited objective (some trustworthy evi-
dence of what the patient would have desired plus satisfactory proof
that the burdens of the patient's life with the treatment outweigh the
benefits); and pure objective (net burdens of life clearly outweigh
benefits, and pain makes further treatment inhumane).61 The court
held that the evidence at trial was inadequate to satisfy any of the
tests, and a new trial would have been necessary had the patient,
Claire Conroy, lived. Claire Conroy died while the case was on ap-
peal, but the New Jersey courts decided to resolve the issues
presented by the case because of their significant public
importance. 62
Several cases from the state of Washington further illustrate the
trend toward accepting private decision to forgo treatment for pa-
tients who are neocortically dead. In In re Bowman,63 Washington
accepted whole brain death as the test for legal death. In Bowman,
56 Id. at 369-74, 486 A.2d at 1233-37.
57 Id. at 336-38, 486 A.2d at 1216-17.
58 In re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 464 A.2d 303 (App. Div. 1983).
59 Id. at 466, 464 A.2d at 310.
60 In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 356-60, 486 A.2d 1209, 1227-29 (1985).
61 Id. at 360-68, 486 A.2d at 1229-33.
62 Id. at 341-42, 486 A.2d at 1219.
63 94 Wash. 2d 407, 421, 617 P.2d 731, 738 (1980). See Tyler & Robertson, Inpart
of the Brain Death Ruling in Washington State, 140 W.J. MED. 625 (1984).
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the court stated that it was not deciding "the much more difficult
question of whether life support mechanisms may be terminated
while a person is still alive but in . . . a 'persistent vegetative
state.' "64 In the 1983 case In re Colyer,65 however, the Washington
Supreme Court answered this issue in the affirmative. 66 The same
court reached a similar result in In re Hamlin, 67 a case that involved
an irreversibly noncognitive patient in a persistent vegetative state
who had no family and, unlike the patient in Colyer, had been incom-
petent his entire life.
In In re L.H.R., 68 the Georgia Supreme Court considered
"under what circumstances may life-support systems be removed
from a terminally ill patient existing in a chronic vegetative state
with no hope of development of cognitive function." 69 L.H.R. in-
volved an infant born in a chronic vegetative state with no hope of
developing cognitive functions. 70 Eighty-five to ninety percent of
the infant's brain tissue had been destroyed, and a neurologist de-
scribed her condition as irreversible. 71 The court determined that
the infant's parents or legal guardian could exercise the right to re-
fuse treatment after a diagnosis that the infant was terminally ill with
no hope of recovery and was in a chronic vegetative state with no
reasonable possibility of attaining cognitive function. 72 In cases in-
volving the irreversible loss of cognitive functions, the court found
no legal difference between an infant and an incompetent adult who
has made no living will.73 Accordingly, the court extended its hold-
ing to terminally ill incompetent adults who are in a chronic vegeta-
tive state with no reasonable possibility of regaining cognitive
functions.74
Cases in Connecticut, 75 Delaware, 76 Florida,77 Louisiana,78
64 94 Wash. 2d at 413, 617 P.2d at 735.
65 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
66 Id. at 136, 660 P.2d at 750. The Washington Supreme Court later summarized
the Colyer holding: "[T]he guardian of a person in a chronic, persistent vegetative state
could consent to the withdrawal of life support systems, at least where the family, the
treating physicians, and a physician's prognosis board agree as to the proper treat-
ment." In re Ingram, 102 Wash. 2d 827, 835, 689 P.2d 1363, 1367 (1984).
67 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
68 253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E.2d 716 (1984).
69 Id., 321 S.E.2d at 717-18.
70 Id., 321 S.E.2d at 718.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 446, 321 S.E.2d at 722-23.
73 Id. at 446-47, 321 S.E.2d at 722-23.
74 Id. at 447, 321 S.E.2d at 723.
75 E.g., Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 482 A.2d 713
(Super. Ct. 1984) (family of irreversibly noncognitive patient granted injunctive relief to
restrain hospital personnel and physicians from continuing use of artificial devices to
maintain cardiopulmonary functions).
76 E.g., Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980)
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Massachusetts, 79 Minnesota,80 New York,81 and Ohio8 2 have also
sanctioned efforts to withdraw artificial life-support machinery from
irreversibly noncognitive infants and adults. Moreover, three states
have passed natural death statutes providing for withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment for patients who are diagnosed as unconscious
with no reasonable possibility of returning to a cognitive sapient
state.83
The development of a distinct right to die jurisprudence, ac-
companied by the New Jersey Supreme Court's elimination of any
distinction between nourishment and other forms of artificial life-
support measures in In re Conroy,8 4 has prompted efforts to termi-
nate the feeding of patients in a persistent vegetative state with no
hope of regaining consciousness even if the patient is not terminally
ill and does not require life-support machines. For example, a re-
cent Massachusetts probate court case involved a wife's efforts to
compel a hospital to cease administering food and water to her irre-
versibly unconscious husband, Paul Brophy.8 5 A neurological evalu-
ation demonstrated that, following Mr. Brophy's cerebral aneurysm
in 1983,86 he was able to breathe and maintain his own heartbeat,
(husband of irreversibly unconscious wife could be appointed guardian for purposes of
removing life-sustaining machinery).
77 E.g., John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla.
1984) (where irreversibly unconscious adult has executed "living" or "mercy" will, fam-
ily members may terminate life-support procedures without prior court approval); In re
Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (parents of terminally ill infant in per-
manent vegetative state with no cognitive functions granted court approval to terminate
child's life-support systems).
78 E.g., In re P.V.W., 424 So. 2d 1015 (La. 1982) (parents authorized to discontinue
life-support systems of severely brain damaged, irreversibly comatose, respirator-depen-
dent newborn infant).
79 E.g., In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978) (validating
order not to resuscitate irreversibly noncogitive vegetative patient with acute
Alzheimer's disease).
80 E.g., In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984) (conservator authorized to ter-
minate life-sustaining respirator treatment of irreversibly noncognitive unconscious
adult patient).
81 E.g., Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431,426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980) (guardian of 83-
year-old irreversibly noncoguitive patient in chronic persistent vegetative state granted
authority to terminate patient's respirator), aff'dsub nor. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420
N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied sub. nom. Storar v. Storar, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
82 E.g., Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1,426 N.E.2d 809 (C.P.
1980) (guardian of terminally ill adult in permanent vegetative state authorized to dis-
continue all life-support systems).
83 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.083 (1984); VA. CODE
§ 54-325.8:6 (Supp. 1985).
84 98 NJ. 321, 369-74, 486 A.2d 1209, 1233-37 (1985).
85 Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., No. 85-E0009-GI, slip op. (P. & Fain.
Ct. Dep't, Norfolk Div., Dedham, Mass. Oct. 21, 1985), appeal transferred to SupremeJudi-
cial Court (No. 86-162, Feb. 14, 1986).
86 Id. at 5-7.
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but he was totally incapable of thought or consciousness. 87 Expert
physicians testified that removing the stomach tube that provided
nourishment would cause Brophy's death in one to three weeks.88
Mrs. Brophy's suit attracted national attention8 9 because the case
was the first attempt to persuade a court to order removal of a feed-
ing tube from a permanently vegetative but not terminally ill
patient. 90
On October 21, 1985, Probate Justice David Kopelman ren-
dered judgment permanently enjoining the hospital, its physicians,
and its staff from removing or clamping Mr. Brophy's feeding tube
for the purpose of denying hydration and nutrition.9 1 The court
also permanently enjoined Mrs. Brophy from authorizing any other
medical facility to discontinue nutrition and hydration should Mr.
Brophy be transferred from the hospital to a nursing home.92
In rejecting Mrs. Brophy's attempt to obtain judicial approval
to discontinue feeding, the court relied upon a number of eviden-
tiary and legal factors. First, the court expressed misgivings as to
whether Brophy was completely unconscious.93 Despite the use of
qualified language, 94 the court nevertheless concluded that the pa-
tient was in a persistent vegetative state and that it was highly un-
likely that Brophy would ever regain cognitive abilities. 95 Second,
87 Id. at 9-12. Dr. Ronald Cranford, chairman of the Ethics and Humanities Com-
mittee of the American Academy of Neurology, described Mr. Brophy's condition: "He
is in a permanent vegetative state. There's no possibility he will recover. He is no more
capable of experiencing pain than someone who is in a coma, brain-dead or dead."
Mancusi, Wife Asks Feeding Tube to be Removed, Bost6n Globe, May 9, 1985, at 28, col. 6.
88 Brophy, slip op. at 28.
89 See Mancusi, supra note 87.
90 Although the New Jersey Supreme Court eliminated any distinction between
nourishment and other types of life-support systems in In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486
A.2d 1209 (1985), the Conroy court described the patient as "an elderly nursing-home
resident who is suffering from serious and permanent mental and physical impairments,
who will probably die within approximately one year even with the treatment." Id. at
342, 486 A.2d at 1219 (footnote omitted).
91 Brophy, slip op. (judgment granting permanent injunction).
92 Id.
93 The court heard testimony from Dr.John F. Sullivan, Chief of Neurology at New
England Medical Center, that Brophy "may be in a 'locked-in state,' which means that he
may have some sensory appreciation of what is happening around him, but is unable to
render a motor response to his environment because the pathways controlling voluntary
motor responses are paralyzed." Id. at 11. The existence of a "locked-in" condition, see
supra note 6, can now be clinically established or ruled out. See infra note 158.
94 The court repeatedly expressed its "findings of fact" regarding Brophy's con-
sciousness in tentative and equivocating terms. For example, the court stated that: "It
is probable that such actions [movement in response to stimuli] are reflexive in nature,
rather than the result of cognitive activity. . . . He appears incapable of either verbal or
non-verbal communication." Brophy, slip op. at 12 (emphasis added).
95 The court stated that it was "highly unlikely that [Brophy] will ever regain cogni-
tive behavior, the ability to communicate, or the capability of interacting purposefully
with his environment." Id.
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the court found that the gastrostomy tube method of furnishing
food and water posed no serious risks of pain or other discomfort, 96
while pain from the withdrawal of food and water could not be ruled
out.97 The court's unwillingness to declare that Mr. Brophy was
completely noncognitive arguably provided a sufficient basis to deny
the requested relief. If the patient is in a "locked-in" syndrome,98
or can think or feel at some meaningful level, the argument for ter-
minating feeding becomes much more troublesome.
The Brophy court, however, found a different basis for enjoining
removal of the feeding tube. Even though Brophy had previously
told his family that he did not want to be kept alive artificially should
his condition become hopeless, 99 the court concluded that this wish
was outweighed by "the most significant of the asserted State inter-
ests. . the preservation of human life."' 0 0 The court held that the
fundamental right to refuse intrusive medical treatment must be
subordinated to the state's interest in preserving human life when
the patient is not terminally ill, the patient has not reached the end
of his normal span of years, and the treatment is not highly invasive
or painful.101 The court stated that if Brophy was terminally ill or
dying, "it might. . . be permissible to remove the feeding tube."'10 2
The court also rejected any effort to justify termination of feeding
on quality of life grounds. "Otherwise," the judge observed, "the
Court is pronouncing judgment that Brophy's life is not worth pre-
serving. The quality of life is an incorrect focus because there are
no manageable criteria for making such ajudgment."' 0 3
The probate court will not, however, have the final word on
Mrs. Brophy's request. On February 14, 1986, the SupremeJudicial
Court of Massachusetts sua sponte transferred the Brophy appeal for
hearing by that court without waiting for a decision by the interme-
diate appellate court.'0 4
Regardless of the ultimate resolution of the Brophy case on ap-
96 Id. at 18, 30, 36.
97 Id. at 29. The court's refusal to find Brophy irreversibly unconscious based upon
the court's erroneous perception that the possibility of a "locked-in" condition could
not be eliminated, see supra notes 93, 94 and infra note 158, led the court to conclude that
it could not medically exclude the potential for experiencing pain. Unlike a patient in a
locked-in state, however, a neocortically dead patient has no capacity to experience pain
or suffering. See supra notes 35-38 & 87 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying
note 117.
98 See supra note 6.
99 Brophy, slip op. at 24-25. See also ABC News 20/20, "Dad Would Want To Die,"
Show No. 546, at 2-4 (Dec. 5, 1985).
100 Brophy, slip op. at 40.
101 Id. at 40-42.
102 Id. at 43.
103 Id. at 42.
104 The appeal is docketed No. 86-162 in the Supreme Judicial Court.
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peal, the lower court's opinion raises several important questions.
First, what difference is there between a request to discontinue feed-
ing via a tube into the patient's stomach and a request to discon-
tinue supplying air or blood flow? In re Conroy'0 5 and Barber v.
Superior Court'06 suggest, contrary to Brophy, that no real difference
exists. The result in Brophy is somewhat surprising in that a prior
Massachusetts Appeals Court case permitted physicians to forgo ab-
dominal surgery on an elderly mentally ill patient who needed to
have a feeding tube surgically inserted.'0 7 Feeding through a stom-
ach tube is just as artificial and invasive as other forms of life-sup-
port that courts have allowed to be withdrawn from irreversibly
unconscious patients.
A second question raised by Brophy is whether in dealing with a
permanently brain damaged patient in a persistent vegetative state
the presence of some terminal illness other than brain damage
should make a difference. Several cases outside of Massachusetts
have treated irreversible unconsciousness alone as sufficient to jus-
tify terminating treatment.10 8 Other courts have characterized irre-
versible unconsciousness as a terminal illness. 10 9 Brophy, however,
made no reference to these cases. The Brophy court attempted to
distinguish prior Massachusetts decisions permitting termination of
treatment by noting that those cases involved either terminally ill (as
opposed to vegetative) patients or procedures that, unlike feeding,
were extremely invasive. 10
Finally, Brophy raised the question whether a patient in a persis-
tent vegetative state is a "human life" so as to implicate the state's
paramount interest in preserving human life. This issue is funda-
mental because if such a patient is not a "human life," the first two
questions become irrelevant. Instead of confronting this question
directly, however, the Brophy court merely asserted the state's inter-
est in preserving human life as the principal factor affecting the de-
105 98 NJ. 321, 369-74, 486 A.2d 1209, 1233-37 (1985).
106 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1016-17, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 490 (1983).
107 In re Hier, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 464 N.E.2d 959 (1984). Although the Hier
court concluded that Conroy and Barber were not controlling, it endorsed the reasoning
of those cases. In rejecting an argument that "nutrition should be differentiated from
treatment and the right of choice confined to the latter," the court stated, "We do not
agree that such a distinction should be drawn as a matter of law." 18 Mass. App. Ct. at
207, 464 N.E.2d at 964.
108 See Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983);
In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983); supra notes 75 & 77.
109 See In re L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439,445, 321 S.E.2d 716, 722 (1984); supra notes 76, 79
& 81. Many persons fear irreversible coma more than any form of disease. See Levy,
supra note 30, at 1426 ("Many lay persons fear permanent incapacitating neurological
disability: 'Whatever you do doctor, don't leave me a vegetable or a permanent burden
on my family.' ").
11o Brophy, slip op. at 41-42.
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cision to bar removal of the feeding tube." ' I
In short, despite the Brophy court's misplaced emphasis on the
supposed difference between artificial life-support systems and arti-
ficial feeding and between terminal illness and terminal uncon-
sciousness, the court nearly hit the mark in focusing on human life.
In isolating the issue, however, the court asked the wrong question.
The question is not whether the state's interest in preserving human
life should prevail over the wishes or substituted judgment of a pa-
tient in a persistent vegetative state. Instead, the fundamental ques-
tion is whether a patient who is no longer aware of the environment
and is doomed to unconsciousness is a human life.
The issues Brophy raised in Massachusetts have also arisen in
two cases filed recently in New Jersey. These cases are particularly
significant because of the New Jersey Supreme Court's refusal in In
re Conroy to draw any distinction between the removal of artificial
life-support machinery and the removal of artificial feeding. 1 2 The
first case, In re Jobes, involves a thirty-one year old woman who
lapsed into a persistent vegetative state during surgery in 1980.113
The patient, Nancy Ellen Jobes, receives no life-sustaining treat-
ment other than a tube that supplies food and liquids directly into
her small intestine. 114 Her husband and parents have filed suit to
obtain an order directing the nursing home to remove the feeding
tube. The pleadings in Jobes assert that "[t]here is no reasonable
possibility that [she] will ever return to a 'cognitive sapient
state.' "115
In the second New Jersey action, a guardian for Hilda M. Peter,
a sixty-five year old woman who suffered massive brain damage fol-
lowing a heart attack in October 1984, has requested approval for
removal of the feeding tube that sustains Peter's existence. 1 6 Neu-
rologists and physicians who have examined Peter conclude that she
is in a persistent vegetative state with no chance of recovery and that
111 Id. at4O.
112 In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 369-74, 486 A.2d 1209, 1233-37 (1985).
113 In re Jobes, No. C-4971-85E (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. filed Oct. 3, 1985). See
Quinlan Lawyer Files Artificial Feeding Suit, Am. Med. News, Oct. 18, 1985, at 1, col. 4.
114 Quinlan Lawyer Files Artificial Feeding Suit, supra note 113.
115 Id. at 8, col. 2. Trial in theJobes case began on March 24, 1986. See Family Pressing
Bid for Removal of Feeding Tube, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1986, at 13, col. 1. On April 23,
1986, the trial court judge ruled that the artificial feeding tube could be removed on the
ground that there was clear and convincing evidence that Mrs. Jobes had previously
expressed the desire not to have her life sustained artificially if she ever became "a help-
less, insensate individual." Jersey Judge Permits Denial of Food to Patient in Coma, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 24, 1986, at 17, col. 5. The court issued a 20-day stay of his ruling to permit
opposing attorneys time to prepare an appeal. Id.
116 In re Peter, No. P-314-85-E (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. filed Nov. 29, 1985). See
Inquiry Weighs Halting Patient's Tube-Feeding, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1985, at B2, col. 5.
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she would feel no pain if feeding were discontinued. 1 7 Pursuant to
New Jersey procedures announced in Conroy, Ombudsman Jack R.
D'Ambrosio, Jr., announced his decision on March 6, 1986, denying
the request to allow removal of the feeding tube from Hilda Pe-
ter. 118 The Ombudsman's statement is a testimonial to the inade-
quacy of Conroy and existing law in dealing with patients who are in a
persistent vegetative state but are not terminally ill. Despite a clear
finding that Peter would not have wanted to continue her life in her
present state, the ombudsman found that he had to deny the request
to remove the feeding tube because Peter did not satisfy the Conroy
requirement that the patient be likely to die within one year. 1 9 The
ombudsman's statement concluded with a call for legislation to al-
low courts to reach appropriate results in cases like Peter.120
The cases and statutes permitting private decisions to terminate
the life-support systems of patients in a persistent vegetative state,
in conjunction with the recent efforts to cease artificial feeding of
irreversibly unconscious patients, compel the conclusion that the
law now gives de facto recognition to neocortical death. Irreversibly
unconscious and noncognitive patients are either dead or alive. If
alive, these patients are presently being put to death by relatives,
guardians, and courts under the logic of substituted judgment or
euthanasia. 121 The final chapter in Karen Ann Quinlan's case viv-
117 Inquiry Weighs Halting Patient's Tube-Feeding, supra note 116.
118 See Statement of Jack R. D'Ambrosio, Jr., Mar. 6, 1986 (on file at Cornell Law
Review). See also Sullivan, Ombudsman Bars Removal of a Feeding-Tube in Jersey, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 7, 1986, at 14, col. 1.
119 Statement of Jack R. D'Ambrosio, Jr., supra note 118, at 2-3.
120
We must come up with answers that make procedures realistic and
workable if we are to expect physicians to follow them. We must develop
clear standards that serve as guidelines and not obstacles. And we must
do so quickly.
Our answers must be flexible enough to meet individual needs and
cannot be dogma of any single philosophy.
What do we need now? We need legislation, whether we call it a
living will or a medical power of attorney law or any other name. And I
believe we need it now, so that we can begin to put these decisions back
into the hands of the patient, where they belong ...
Our society is growing older. Our medical technology continues to
improve. Questions about the quality and dignity of life are being asked
more often. No one profession or discipline can provide all the answers.
The wisdom and the knowledge of all disciplines must be brought to-
gether. There will be more Hilda Peters. Whether their cases will be re-
ported to the Ombudsman's Office as required by law, we cannot be
certain. We can be certain that the unanswered issues will not disappear.
Id. at 4.
121 See Kamisar, Speaking Out: Karen Quinlan and the "Right-to-Die, - 29 L. QUADRANGLE
NoTEs 2 (1985) ("But look again: was it [Quinlan] really a 'right-to-die' case? I think not.
I believe it more accurate-albeit much more troublesome-to view it as what might be
called a 'power-to-let-some-other-die' case."); Piccione, No One Has a Right to End a
Human Life, USA Today, Mar. 19, 1986, at 8A, col. 5 ("When we deprive a person of
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idly illustrates the point. Quinlan was pronounced dead onJune 11,
1985. She did not die of any brain disorder, but from pneumonia
which had been diagnosed for months. 122 The Quinlan family had
asked that no extraordinary measures be taken to keep her alive,
including the administration of antibiotics or blood pressure
drugs.123- The family renewed their request that no revival efforts be
undertaken when they were told that death was imminent. 124 If
Karen Ann Quinlan was a living human being prior to June 11,
1985, the family exercised a form of passive euthanasia by allowing
her "to die" when and as she did. 125
The point here is not one of fault but how best to cope with the
difficult decisions concerning permanently vegetative patients.
Which justification for terminating treatment of the irreversibly un-
conscious makes more sense: withholding feeding or life-support
because the patients are already dead, or terminating therapy to liv-
ing persons because relatives believe that the patients' lives should
end because substitute decisionmakers suspect that the patients
would have wanted this result. 126 Ordinarily, intentionally ending
the life of another, whether by act or omission, is homicide. One
can finesse the obvious overtones of euthanasia and rationalize the
substitute judgment approach by arguing, as courts following Quin-
lan have done, that dispensing death to an incompetent patient is
merely affirming the incompetent patient's constitutional or com-
mon law right to refuse medical treatment and die. This may be the
only acceptable answer to the dilemma of withdrawing treatment or
nourishment from living, but terminally ill patients who retain con-
food and water, we are not 'letting him or her die,' as the popular phrase has it. We are
knowingly and intentionally causing death by abandonment. This discussion is not a
new one, but in earlier years, we were honest enough to call it by its real name: euthana-
sia, the taking of the innocent life of the ill and infirm.").
122 Karen Ann Quinlan, 31, Dies; Focus of '76 Right to Die Case, N.Y. Times, June 12,
1985, at Al, col. 2.
123 Id.
124 Id. The same scenario occurred in the Brophy case: Mrs. Brophy requested the
staff to implement a "non-aggressive treatment plan" which provided that antibiotics
were not to be administered in the event of a life-threatening infection. Brophy v. New
England Sinai Hosp. Inc., No. 85-E0009-G1, slip. op. at 20 (P. & Fam. Ct. Dep't, Norfolk
Div., Dedham, Mass. Oct. 21, 1985), appeal transferred to SupremeJudicial Court (No. 86-
162, Feb. 14, 1986). The probate court specifically approved this nonagressive treat-
ment plan. Id. at 21.
125 See White, Bioethical Issue Pondered: What Should We Do For Hopeless Patients?, Am.
Med. News, Oct. 25, 1985, at 26, col. 1.
126 See Kamisar, The Real Quinlan Issue, N.Y. Times, June 17, 1985, at AI9, col. 1
("We cannot enter the minds of comatose people to learn if they wish to struggle on.
But we can end the fiction of presuming to speak in their behalf. Instead, let courts be
honest and say life-support systems should be turned off not because of patient's wishes
but, alas, because they think the patient is 'better off dead.' ").
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sciousness and cognition.' 27
If neocortical death is the death of a human being, however, the
substitute judgment test becomes an unnecessary mind trip, a
profound leap into the dark work of the permanently insentient.
Worse, the current use of the substitute judgment model creates
procedural and legal presumptions against withholding or terminat-
ing treatment or nourishment. The substitute judgment approach
unreasonably burdens families, physicians, and courts with the ago-
nizing decision of whether to "play God" and "let the patient die,"
even though, rightly viewed, human death has already occurred. Fi-
nally, the desire to obtain the legal results of death (insurance bene-
fits, inherited property, favorable date of death tax valuations, or
remarriage) may motivate relatives or guardians to terminate a pa-
tient's biological existence or deliberate precisely as to when death
should be doled out.
A more just and sensible position is to consider irreversibly un-
conscious noncognitive patients legally dead, but to recognize and
account for the possibility of continuing biological existence. When
a patient becomes neocortically dead, legal consequences that flow
from death, such as criminal liability, should be set in motion. In
the example of a robber who shoots a man in the head, suppose that
instead of sustaining whole brain death the victim retains brain stem
function but falls into a chronic unconscious vegetative state with no
hope of regaining cognitive function. Should the robber escape a
murder prosecution? 128 If the victim's spouse is a named beneficiary
under a life insurance policy, should the life insurance company be
able to deny death benefits?' 29 Should the spouse be barred from
remarrying? Should relatives base their decision of when to termi-
nate life-support systems upon tax and estate planning considera-
tions? 30 Little in logic or social policy supports an affirmative
127 A recently completed study of a large renal dialysis center in Minnesota found
that 22% of the deaths at the facility between 1966 and 1983 occurred as a result of
withdrawal of renal dialysis therapy. Neu & Kjellstrand, Stopping Long-Term Dialysis, An
Empirical Study of Withdrawal of Life-Supporting Treatment, 314 NEw ENG.J. MED. 14 (1986).
The report concluded "that stopping treatment is a common mode of death in patients
receiving long-term dialysis, particularly in those who are old and those who have com-
plicating degenerative diseases. Because of the increasing age of patients on dialysis,
withdrawal of treatment will probably become more common in the future." Id. See also
supra note 50.
128 This example parallels the well publicized trial of Claus von Billow. Under a
neocortical definition of death Mr. von Billow could have been charged with first degree
murder of his wife instead of attempted murder.
129 See Thornton, supra note 9.
130 See Jorrie & Standley, The Tax Advantages of Lingering Death, 48 TEX. B.J. 1070
(1985). Jorrie and Standley present "the tax planning opportunities available to the
attorney representing a client suffering a prolonged illness inevitably leading to death."
Id. The authors describe how favorable tax results can be achieved by removing assets
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answer to any of these questions. A certificate establishing death for
all legal purposes should be issued upon a medical finding of ne-
ocortical death.'13
Would this mean that all persons declared legally dead by ne-
ocortical standards would have to be buried or cremated? 132 Would
families or guardians be permitted to maintain biological existence
if they so desired or if the patient had so specified by a pre-existing
death directive or living will? Treating the neocortically dead as le-
gally dead does not and should not require burial or cremation. A
patient by prior directive, or the patient's family or guardian by a
post-neocortical death decision, should be able to obtain biological
maintenance notwithstanding a legal certification of neocortical
death. Once the law treats neocortical death as legal death, no pub-
lic health need or other strong policy reason requires disposal of the
body. If the individual or family wishes to maintain biological exist-
ence because of religious or other personal beliefs, this wish should
be respected. In effect, after a legal and medical determination of
neocortical death, the body should be in the hands of the estate's
administrator or family to be treated in an appropriate, humane,
and ethical manner. Burial, cremation, or biological maintenance
are all within the realm of appropriate choices.
The medical profession and legislators would have to decide
whether to subsidize biological maintenance of a neocortically dead
from the estate, discounting the value of the remaining estate assets, and delaying or
deferring the transfer of taxes. In a section entitled "Using a 'Pull the Plug' Directive for
Timing of Death," the authors go so far as to recommend that tax attorneys obtain a
durable power of attorney to delay or withhold death directives from attending physi-
cians (assuming the client had the foresight to execute a death directive under a natural
death act or living will law) to achieve tax savings by delaying the moment of death:
If the client is not suffering, withholding the directive near year-end
and thus delaying the actual moment of death can allow for tax planning
to take advantage of the IRC § 2503(b) $ 10,000 gift exclusion amount for
each donee for another year. In other words, if the client reached this
condition near year-end, with creative tax advice and prior planning, the
client could, in effect, permit others to select for him the tax year in which
he died.
Id. at 1073 (footnote omitted).
131 Under a neocortical death definition, Karen Ann Quinlan would have been de-
clared legally dead in 1975 instead of 1985. Thousands of other patients who now bio-
logically subsist in a chronic vegetative state with no hope of regaining cognitive
function would also be considered legally dead.
132 The President's Commission seemed to think so. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra
note 4, at 40 ("[T]he implication of the personhood and personal identity arguments is
that Karen Quinlan, who retains brain stem function and breathes spontaneously, is just
as dead as a corpse in the traditional sense. The Commission rejects this conclusion and
the further implication that such patients could be buried or otherwise treated as dead
persons."). See also Bernat, Culver & Gert, On the Definition and Citerion of Death, supra
note 5, at 391 ("A practical problem also arises in considering chronically vegetative
patients with spontaneous ventilation to be dead. To bury such patients while they
breathe and have a heartbeat, most would view as at least aesthetically unacceptable.").
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body when the family desires such maintenance but cannot afford it.
Although debatable, continuing the existence of a legally dead body
should be subject to the financial ability of the estate or relatives to
pay for the costs of treatment. Society should not incur the ex-
penses for medical maintenance because society's interest is mini-
mal, given that the body is legally dead. 33 The tradeoff is not
between dollars and human life but between dollars and biological
maintenance.
Absent a directive by the deceased or next of kin for biological
maintenance, however, burial or cremation would occur. How
would this be done? As Karen Quinlan's case demonstrated, stop-
ping life-support systems may not produce cardiopulmonary death
if the patient is capable of spontaneous ventilation. To induce bio-
logical death, two procedures seem reasonable: passive termination
by withholding nourishment and fluids or active termination by
chemical injection. Ending nourishment and hydration produces bi-
ological death by slow starvation and dehydration.' 34 Although a
neocortically dead patient does not experience the pain of starva-
tion and thirst, 35 relatives and friends may suffer when witnessing
their loved one wither away over a period of weeks. Thus, if a ne-
ocortically dead patient biologically exists without the aid of artifi-
cial life-support machines, active termination by injection may be a
more humane procedure to induce biological death than withdraw-
133 Dr. William Schwartz, a professor of medicine at Tufts University, has stated, "If
I know that keeping someone alive for another few months at a cost of $100,000 will
mean that sum is not available for the care of several people with severe hip or heart
disease, then I have a new kind of moral dilemma: Is it proper for me to use that limited
resource for maintaining life of poor quality for a few months, denying care to others for
whom I also have a responsibility?"). Schwartz, U.S. Medicine "Cannot Do Everything for
Everybody, " U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 25, 1984, at 72. A study published by a
group of leading neurologists concluded: "Continued support of these 88 patients in-
volved a total of over 500 hospital days, frequently in intensive care units. Not only was
this useless terminal care costly (over $250,000) but the intensive care beds could have
been used to treat patients with greater chances of recovery." Levy, supra note 30, at
1426. The costs of biologically maintaining a neocortically dead body are substantial.
See Goodman, supra note 30, at 27, col. 3 ("[Patients in a 'chronic vegetative state'] are in
hospital beds at an average cost of $150,000 per person per year."); Mancusi, supra note
87, at 28, col. 6 ("[Mr. Brophy's] care, which costs $10,500 per month, is being paid for
by Blue Cross.").
134 In Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., No. 85-E0009-G1, slip op. at 28-29
(P. & Fain. Ct. Dep't, Norfolk Div., Dedham, Mass. Oct. 21, 1985), appeal transferred to
Supreme Judicial Court (No. 86-162, Feb. 14, 1986), expert physicians testified that
withholding food and water from Brophy would produce certain death from starvation,
or more probably dehydration, within five days to three weeks. The trial judge noted:
"[T]he above-described process [withdrawal of foods and fluids] is extremely painful
and uncomfortable for a human being. Brophy's attending physician was unable to im-
agine a more cruel and violent death than thirsting to death." Id. at 29.
135 Persons who are neocortically dead cannot experience pain. See supra notes 35-
38, 87, 97, 117 and accompanying text.
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ing fluids and nourishment. As with whole brain dead patients,
however, neocortically dead patients should be buried or cremated
only upon the cessation of cardiopulmonary functions.
A practical problem may arise if, out of fear of criminal or civil
liability or because of personal ethical or religious beliefs, physi-
cians, nursing home employees, or others charged with caring for
neocortically dead patients refuse to withdraw feeding tubes or in-
ject chemicals to bring about biological termination. Once neocor-
tical death becomes legally recognized, however, fears of criminal
and civil liability for performing approp.,iate termination proce-
dures pursuant to the wishes of the patient or family become
unfounded.
To avoid such concerns, a neocortical death statute should de-
fine death, outline termination procedures, and incorporate an im-
munity principle in clear terms. A model statute might read as
follows:
Neocortical Death
Sec. 1. For the purpose of this statute, "neocortical death"
means the irreversible loss of consciousness and cogni-
tive functions. An individual who has sustained neocor-
tical death is legally dead. A determination of
neocortical death under this section must be made in ac-
cordance with reasonable medical standards and
procedures.
Sec. 2. After a medical determination of neocortical death, the
individual may be biologically maintained if the individ-
ual has executed a written instrument [in accordance
with the jurisdiction's living will statutes or procedures]
expressing the desire to be maintained on artificial life-
support systems in the event of neocortical death. If the
individual has made no such prior written declaration,
the family, next of kin, or guardian may provide for bio-
logical maintenance.
Sec. 3. If neither the individual (by a prior written directive) nor
the family, next of kin, or guardian elects to provide for
biological maintenance, all artificial life-support systems
may be withheld and terminated, and the provision of
nourishment and fluids may be withheld or ceased. As
an alternative to the withholding or cessation of nourish-
ment and fluids as a means of terminating biological
existence, the family, next of kin, or guardian may re-
quest injection of a chemical in a quantity sufficient to
cause biological death. The chemical must be adminis-




Sec. 4 No person, firm, or organization shall be subject to crimi-
nal responsibility or civil liability for terminating the bio-
logical existence of a neocortically dead individual by any
of the methods or procedures authorized in Section 3
(withholding or terminating artificial life-support systems,
cessation of nourishment and hydration, or lethal chemi-
cal injection).' 3 7
With legal recognition of neocortical death and an express
criminal and civil immunity for terminating the biological existence
of neocortically dead patients, a medical and ethical consensus may
evolve that considers termination of neocortically dead patients' bi-
ological functions by cessation of nourishment and fluids or by
chemical injections an acceptable and ethical medical practice. Such
a consensus is already developing. For example, in July 1985 the
Massachusetts Medical Society's governing council endorsed a reso-
lution that recognizes the appropriateness of discontinuing nourish-
ment in the case of vegetative individuals:
"The MMS recognizes the autonomy rights of terminally ill
and/or vegetative individuals who have previously expressed their
wishes to refuse treatment, including the use of intravenous fluids
and gastrointestinal feeding by a tube, and that implementation of
these wishes by a physician does not in itself constitute unethical
medical behavior provided that appropriate medical and family
consultation is obtained."' 38
Similarly, at the national level, at a conference in New Orleans in
March 1986, the American Medical Association's Council on Ethical
and Judicial Affairs issued a statement that physicians may ethically
withhold or withdraw artificial feeding and hydration from terminal
or irreversibly comatose patients where adequate procedural safe-
136 Cf TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 43.14 (Vernon Supp. 1986) ("Whenever the
sentence of death is pronounced against a convict, the sentence shall be executed...
by intravenous injection of a substance or substances in a lethal quantity sufficient to
cause death .. ").
137 Cf In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 385, 486 A.2d 1209, 1242 (1985) ("In the absence
of bad faith, no participant in the decision-making process [to terminate treatment or
nourishment] shall be civilly or criminally liable for actions taken in accordance with the
procedures set forth in this opinion.").
138 Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., No. 85-E0009-GI, slip op. at 32 (P. &
Fam.Ct. Dep't, Norfolk Div., Dedham, Mass. Oct. 21, 1985), appeal transferred to Supreme
Judicial Court (No. 86-162, Feb. 14, 1986). See Pact on Right to Die Cited in Court Case, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 6, 1985, at A10, col. 6 ("Charles Amorsino, executive secretary of the Mas-
sachusetts Medical Society, testified [in Brophy] that his governing council had endorsed
a policy recognizing the rights of terminally ill and 'vegetative' patients to reject life-
saving treatment."). Similar resolutions have been enacted by the Milwaukee County
Medical Society and the Los Angeles Medical Society. Feeding Withdrawal Gets Conditional
Nod, Am. Med. News, Mar. 28, 1986, at 9, col. 2.
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guards are present.'i 9
In short, considering that a respectable body of medical opin-
ion already views the termination of feeding of vegetative patients as
an acceptable and ethical medical practice, clear legal validation of
termination procedures should influence the medical community to
generally respect the wishes of the individual patient or family to
cease maintaining a legally dead body.140
139 The statement in full reads as follows:
Withholding or Withdrawing Life Prolonging Medical Treatment
The social commitment of the physician is to sustain life and relieve
suffering. Where the performance of one duty conflicts with the other,
the choice of the patient, or his family or legal representative if the pa-
tient is incompetent to act in his own behalf, should prevail. In the ab-
sence of the patient's choice or an authorized proxy, the physician must
act in the best interest of the patient.
For humane reasons, with informed consent, a physician may do
what is medically necessary to alleviate severe pain, or cease or omit
treatment to permit a terminally ill patient whose death is imminent to
die. However, he should not intentionally cause death. In deciding
whether the administration of potentially life-prolonging medical treat-
ment is in the best interest of the patient who is incompetent to act in his
own behalf, the physician should determine what the possibility is for ex-
tending life under humane and comfortable conditions and what are the
prior expressed wishes of the patient and attitudes of the family or those
who have responsibility for the custody'of the patient.
Even if death is not imminent but a patient's coma is beyond doubt
irreversible and there are adequate safeguards to confirm the accuracy of
the diagnosis and with the concurrence of those who have responsibility
for the care of the patient, it is not unethical to discontinue all means of
life prolonging medical treatment.
Life prolonging medical treatment includes medication and artifi-
cially or technologically supplied respiration, nutrition or hydration. In
treating a terminally ill or irreversibly comatose patient, the physician
should determine whether the benefits of treatment outweigh its bur-
dens. At all times, the dignity of the patient should be maintained.
Statement of the Council on Ethical andJudicial Affairs of the American Medical Association, March
15, 1986 (on file at the Cornell Law Review). See Feeding Withdrawal Gets Conditional Nod,
supra note 138; Reassessing Care of Dying, Policy Seen Evolving From A.M.A. Opinion, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 17, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
140 In the event that a particular physician, hospital, or nursing home steadfastly
refuses to cease feeding or to administer a lethal chemical injection to end the biological
existence of a neocortically (and, therefore, legally) dead body, a court order to cease
feeding would seem appropriate. See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985)
(setting forth procedures for ordering and obtaining removal of feeding tube); supra
notes 113, 116 (cases seeking court approval to remove feeding tubes). Once the law
and a respectable portion of the medical community accept termination under these
circumstances, health care providers in charge of neocortically dead patients have a
legal, and arguably ethical, duty at least to place the decedent's family or guardian in
touch with a physician or hospital willing to perform the procedure. Ordering health
care professionals to actively terminate patients by intravenous chemical injection will
not be appropriate until a new medical ethic develops in this area. Legal acceptance of
such appropriate termination procedures as cessation of feeding or administration of
chemical injections would also allow guardians or responsible family members to re-
move feeding tubes or administer chemical injections in a humane manner. See Jersey
Judge Permits Denial of Food to Patient in Coma, supra note 115 ("The ruling. . . permits Mr.
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III
DIAGNOSING NEOCORTICAL DEATH
The preceding discussion assumes that neocortical death would
be diagnosed in accordance with accepted medical procedures. Ar-
guably, the right to die cases involving irreversibly unconscious pa-
tients have established a medical and legal precedent because expert
physicians repeatedly have testified with confidence that the patients
involved in the particular cases were irreversibly unconscious and
insentient.' 4 1 In a great number of cases, particularly when vegeta-
tive unconsciousness has lasted for more than one month, physi-
cians routinely diagnose irreversibility based upon clinical
evaluations and diagnostic procedures such as electroencephalo-
gram (EEG) tests.' 42 Nevertheless, critics of a neocortical death def-
inition repeatedly refer to the difficulty of formulating reliable
diagnostic criteria for neocortical death.' 43 These critics argue that
while physicians in Great Britain contended as early as 1971 that in
most cases a flat electroencephalogram and biopsy specimen could
confirm neocortical death,1 44 these procedures, unlike the well ac-
cepted whole brain death criteria, 145 are an imprecise and invasive
means of diagnosing irreversible unconsciousness. In 1983, for ex-
ample, Younger and Bartlett, themselves proponents of a neocorti-
cal definition, concluded: "At present, clinicians are unable to apply
a definition that identifies death as the absence of consciousness and
cognition. Medical science has not yet developed tests that accu-
rately establish the irreversible loss of these functions."' 46
Several observations must be made regarding this criticism.
First, even if physicians cannot always diagnose neocortical death
with certainty, they can diagnose irreversibility with certitude in a
significant number of cases. Neurologists are making such diagno-
ses today and are testifying in court cases involving efforts to termi-
nate life-support machinery and artificial feeding.' 47 The American
Medical Association's recent policy statement approving withdrawal
or withholding of artificial feeding of irreversibly comatose patients
Jobes to take his wife home, 'where the feeding may be removed under the direct super-
vision of a licensed physician of this state.' ").
141 See supra notes 74-82 & 87 and text accompanying note 69.
142 See supra notes 74-82 & 87 and text accompanying note 69. See also supra note 30.
143 See Bernat, Culver & Gert, On the Definition and Criterion of Death, supra note 58, at
391; Korein, The Problem of Brain Death: Development and History, 315 ANNALS OF N.Y.
ACAD. OF SCI. 19, 27 (1978); Walton, Epistemology of Brain Death Determination, 2
METAMEDICINE 259, 270 (1981); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 4, at 40.
144 Brierly, Adams, Graham & Simpson, Neocortical Death After Cardiac Arrest, 2 LAN-
CET 560, 565 (1971).
145 See supra note 5.
146 Younger & Bartlett, supra note 4, at 258.
147 See supra note 141.
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also recognizes that accurate diagnosis of irreversible unconscious-
ness is now possible in many cases.' 48 Second, the inevitability of
scientific progress suggests that the limits of present medical tech-
nologies are no reason to avoid addressing the appropriateness of a
neocortical death standard. Third, and most important, science is
on the verge of overcoming whatever diagnostic limitations exist.
The recent advent of positron emission tomography (PET) scanning
now offers the scientific capability of accurately diagnosing meta-
bolic brain function and neocortical death.
PET scanning technology has advanced rapidly in recent
years.' 49 With a video screen and specific tracers labeled with posi-
148 See supra note 139.
149 According to Dr. Philip Anderson, Vice-President of the Society of Nuclear
Medicine, "Although Positron Emission Computed Tomography, or PET technology,
was developed in the 1970s, its refinement is the most important medical and scientific
breakthrough being presented at the Society of Nuclear Medicine's 32nd annual'meet-
ing [in Houston, Texas, June 1985]." Luna, Breakthrough Cited for Understanding Treatment
of Brain Disorders, U.P.I. News Release, June 4, 1985 (available on NEXIS, Omni library).
Dr. Henry Wagner, Jr., hailed the dramatic development of PET scanning technol-
ogy in an editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine.
Today we are witnessing the birth of a new technique for the study of the
human brain, based on the use of radioactive tracer molecules labeled
with carbon-1l, fluorine-18, and oxygen-15. . . .After injection, the bi-
odistribution of the tracers is portrayed by positron-emission tomogra-
phy (PET). In a typical study, the cyclotron-produced radioactive atom is
incorporated into a substrate, such as glucose or fatty acid, or into a drug
... .The intravenously injected glucose or oxygen is metabolized in
bioenergetic pathways . . . . Serial images of regions within the brain
are produced by the measurement of gamma rays coming from within
different regions of the brain. . . . A PET scanner is similar to a com-
puted tomography (CT) scanner except that gamma rays are emitted
from within the patient ifistead of traveling across the brain as in x-ray
CT.
As a result of work performed in several countries throughout the
world beginning in the mid-1970s, it is now well established that measur-
able increases in regional blood flow and in glucose and oxygen metabo-
lism accompany mental functions, including perception, cognition and
emotion. ...
The ability to study neurotransmitters and neuroreceptors as well as
the substrate metabolism of the brain makes it increasingly likely that
every major university medical center will have a cyclotron and positron
tomographic device within the next 5 to 10 years .....
It is predictable that regional cyclotrons, whether operating at uni-
versity medical centers or commercially developed, will soon provide
short-lived tracers labeled with carbon-II or fluorine-18 to community
hospitals throughout a city. . . .Another developing clinical application
is the measurement of regional oxygen metabolism as an indicator of the
survivability of involved regions of the brain in patients with strokes
...Perhaps it is not overstating the case to say that in positron-
emitting tracers in community hospitals and PET in major medical cen-
ters, we now have a new set of eyes that permit us to begin to examine the
chemistry of the mind.
Wagner, Probing the Chemistby of the lind, 312 NEw ENG.J. MED. 44, 45-46 (1985). See also
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tron-emitting isotopes, scientists can now measure the brain's intri-
cate chemistry in vivo by viewing blood flow or uptake of glucose
and oxygen in selected subregions of the brain and thereby assess
higher brain functions.' 50 PET scanning studies correlating human
brain disorders (Alzheimer's disease, 151 Huntington's disease, 152
PET Scans Relate Clinical Picture to More Specific Nerve Function, 253 J. A.M.A. 943 (1985)
[hereinafter cited as PET Scans].
150 See Cherry & Cherry, Another Way of Looking at The Brain, N.Y. Times, June 9,
1985, (Magazine), at 56, col. 1.
Where CAT and M.R.I. excel at revealing details of the brain's anatomy,
Positron Emission Tomography (PET) shows the brain actually at work,
going about its minute-by-minute metabolic business. "CAT and M.R.I.
are like road maps, PET shows the traffic moving on the roads," explains
Dr. Thomas N. Chase, chief of experimental therapeutics at the National
Institute of Neurological and Communicative Disorders and Stroke, in
Bethesda, Md ...
Before a scan, the patient is injected with a form of sugar that has
been radioactively tagged to enable scientists to watch it as it proceeds
along its chemical path. The sugar quickly passes to the alvays-hungry
brain cells, where the glucose is rapidly absorbed-quite literally becom-
ing food for thought. As it is digested, the substance emits particles
called positrons, which collide with electrons to produce gamma rays.
Computers then add all the information together, producing a picture of
something never before seen so accurately: the brain at work. Suddenly
an act of intention can be caught inflagrante, captured in the easy-to-iden-
tify gaudy blues and psychedelic yellows often used in PET scans. If you
listen to a snatch of music uncritically, PET will show, by color, one part
of your brain activating; if you analyze the sound, other parts of the brain
will function, producing a different image. Decide to raise your hand,
and your decision will appear on the scan in different colors and in differ-
ent areas as your brain makes ready to obey your wish.
Id. at 110-11.
PET "traces biological molecules in the body," says Dr. Steve M. Larson,
chief of the department of nuclear medicine at NIH's Clinical Center,
where the installation of a new PET system is nearly completed. "The
basic importance is that we can measure the body's metabolism" for the
first time.
Instead of seeing an anatomical image of the inside of the brain, the
PET measures its activity. PET is being studied as a way of diagnosing
epilepsy, stroke and Parkinson's disease, tracking blood flow in the body
and following the progress of tumors.
Thompson, The Body Transparent: High Tech Devices Let Doctor See the View From Within,
Washington Post, Oct. 23, 1985, Health at 14, col. 2. See also infra note 161.
151 See Cutler, Haxby, Durara, Grady, Kay, Kessler, Sundaram & Rapoport, Clinical
History, Brain Metabolism, and Neuropsychological Function in Alzheimer's Disease, 18 ANNALS OF
NEUROLOGY 298 (1985); Foster, Chase, Fedio, Patronas, Brooks & Di Chiro, AL-heimer's
Disease: Focal Cortical Changes Shown by Positron Emission Tomography, 33 NEUROLOGY 961
(1985).
152 See Wong, PET Imaging of Dopamine and Serotonin Receptors in Huntington's Chorea
(paper presented at the International Symposium on Clinical Applications of Ra-
dionuclide Studies of the Brain, Washington, D.C., 1984); Whitehouse, Trifiletti, Jones,
Folstein, Price, Snyder & Kuhar, Neurotransmitter Receptor Alterations in Huntington's Disease:
Autoradiographic and Homogenate Studies with Special Reference to Benzodiazepine Receptor Com-
plexes, 18 ANNALS OF NEUROLOGY 202, 209 (1985).
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brain tumors, 53 dementia,t 54 cerebral infarction,155 stroke,'156 and
Parkinson's disease' 57) with reduced levels of glucose and oxygen
utilization and blood flow have already yielded significant findings.
According to leading neurologists and radiologists, PET scan-
ning may soon yield a reliable operative test for diagnosing irrevers-
ible loss of consciousness.1 58  Neurological studies currently
153 Jarden, Dhawan, Poltorak, Posner & Rottenberg, Positron Emission Tomographic
Measurement of Blood-to-Brain and Blood-to-Tumor Transport of 82Rb: The Effect of Dex-
amethasone and Whole-Brain Radiation Therapy, 18 ANNALS OF NEUROLOGY 636 (1985).
154 See Mesulam, Dementia: Its Definition, Differential Diagnosis, and Subtypes, 252 J.
A.M.A. 2559, 2560 (1985).
155 See Wise, Rhodes, Gibbs, Hatazawa, Palmer, Frackowiak & Jones, Disturbance of
Oxidative Metabolism of Glucose in Recent Human Cerebral Infarcts, 14 ANNALS OF NEUROLOGY
627 (1983).
156 See Kuhl, Phelps, Kowell, Metter, Selin & Winter, Effects of Stroke on Local Cerebral
Metabolism and Perfusion: Mapping by Emission Computed Tomography of FDG and NIH, 8 AN-
NALS OF NEUROLOGY 47 (1980).
157 See Thompson, Designer Drug [MPTP] Linked to Parkinson's, Washington Post, June
12, 1985, Health at 9, col. I: "[PET] scans show that dopamine distribution is equally
reduced in the brains of both drug addicts and older Parkinson's patients."
158 Dr. John C. Mazziota, Associate Professor of Neurological and Radiological Sci-
ences at the U.C.L.A. School of Medicine, a principal investigator in the U.C.L.A. PET
scanning laboratory and Chief of the Neurological section, states that PET scanning of-
fers a very reasonable potential for success in formulating reliable criteria for assessing
irreversible loss of consciousness. Mazziota believes a study involving PET scanning of
patients in the persistent vegetative state would lead to formulation of diagnostic guide-
lines. He states that such a study is currently being done at the Cornell University Medi-
cal College. Telephone interview withJohn C. Mazziota, M.D. (Dec. 13, 1985) (notes of
interview on file with author).
Dr. David E. Levy, Associate Professor of Neurology at Cornell University Medical
College in New York City, together with Dr. Fred Plum, Professor of Medicine and
Chairman of the Department of Neurology at Cornell University Medical School, cur-
rently are directing the Cornell PET scan study of vegetative patients. Although their
findings are not yet published, two abstracts from the study have been submitted to the
American Academy of Neurology for its meeting in St. Louis in March 1986. The ab-
stracts (one study of three vegetative patients and one locked-in patient and a second
study of one locked-in patient) are authored by Levy, Rottenberg, Jarden, Sidtis,
Strother, Thaler, Dhawin and Plum. The abstracts are titled: "PET Studies of Regional
r CMRG lu [research cerebral metabolism for glucose levels] in Vegetative and Locked-
in Patients."
The Cornell study details several significant findings. First, vegetative patients who
have suffered cerebral hypoxia-ischemia (e.g., cardiac arrest) show markedly decreased
levels of glucose utilization and blood flow. Dr. Levy states that the levels are pro-
foundly depressed, indicating a severe loss of neocortical functions. Second, Dr. Levy
notes that PET scans have revealed that patients in a "locked-in syndrome" (see supra
note 6), as opposed to patients in a persistent vegetative state, show normal levels of
glucose utilization and blood flow. Thus, Dr. Levy concludes that PET scanning can
now determine whether a patient is locked-in. Dr. Levy believes that PET scanning com-
bined with traditional methods of clinical evaluation of vegetative patients will enable
doctors reliably to diagnose the irreversibility of the persistent vegetative state. Tele-
phone interview with David E. Levy, M.D. (Dec. 16, 1985) (notes of interview on file with
author).
Dr. Henry H. Wagner, Jr., Professor of Medicine, Radiology and Environmental
Health Services at The Johns Hopkins Medical Institution and Director of the Division
of Nuclear Medicine and Radiological Health Services, believes that the use of PET scan-
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underway at Cornell University Medical College in New York City
use PET scanning techniques to confirm that vegetative patients
who have been without consciousness for lengthy periods have sig-
nificantly depressed levels of glucose utilization and blood flow.' 59
As more PET scans are performed on neocortically dead patients,
medical scientists will be able to formulate threshold levels of bio-
energetic chemical utilization below which persons never regain
consciousness.16 0 In short, with the breakthrough in PET scanning,
the argument that neocortical death is incapable of being reliably
diagnosed is no longer tenable.
PET scanning technology is expensive. Although PET scanners
cost approximately $1.5 million,161 twenty-six medical centers in the
United States now perform PET scans, 162 and plans for PET scan-
ning operations are underway throughout the country. 163 As usage
ning to diagnose irreversible loss of consciousness will be proven successful in clinical
studies. Dr. Wagner concludes that PET scan analysis of the electrical and chemical
metabolism of the brain will establish discrete chemical levels that correlate with irre-
versibility. Telephone interview with Henry N. Wagner, Jr. (Dec. 23, 1985) (interview
notes on file with author).
Dr. Gerald M. Fenichel, Professor of Medicine and Chairman of the Neurology De-
partment at Vanderbilt University Medical School, also believes that PET scanning will
facilitate development of an operative diagnostic test for determining irreversible loss of
consciousness. Interview with Gerald M. Fenichel, M.D. (Dec. 13, 1985) (notes of inter-
view on file with author).
159 See supra note 158.
160 See supra note 158.
161 See Radiology: Newest Diagnostic Probes: Super Snapshots Inside the Body Pinpoint Trouble
Spots, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Nov. 11, 1985, at 58:
One of the first of a new wave of imaging techniques that can mea-
sure metabolism and show response to drugs is a 1.5 million-dollar de-
vice called PET. Shaped like a giant tire, the Positron Emission
Tomography device is used to map the brain by measuring the way cells
use glucose, their main fuel. Scans show different brain patterns when a
person is thinking, resting, listening to music or remembering.
PET can show differences between the brains of healthy people and
those with symptoms of Alzheimer's disease.
It is proving to be the best tool in locating damaged tissue in the
brain ....
See also Raeburn, New Scanner is First to Diagnose Alzheimer's, Other Brain Disorders, A.P. News
Release, May 28, 1985 ("The cost of a completely equipped PET center is expected to
be about $2 million," stated Dr. Michael Phelps of the University of California at Los
Angeles.); Hospitals, Doctors Must Join Forces to Buy Costly Equipment, Washington Post, Oct.
23, 1985, Health at 15, col. 1.
162 The Brain Yields Its Secrets to Research, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 3, 1985, at
64. See Cherry & Cherry, supra note 150, at 116 ("in Japan, always a bellwether country
in technology, there are eight PET scanners in operation, and experts believe mostJapa-
nese medical schools will soon be outfitted with PET units").
163 See The Brain Yields Its Secrets to Research, supra note 162 ("PET is expected to be
ready for routine use within five years."); Hospitals, Doctors MustJoin Forces to Buy Costly
Equipment, supra note 161 (" 'I personally believe. . . that major hospitals and univer-
sity hospitals will have PET,' says Dr. Steven M. Larson, chief of nuclear medicine at
NIH's Clinical Center."); Methodist Hospital Shows Off Aeu Scanner, A.P. News Release,July
30, 1985 ("Eventually, [Dr. Eugene D. Van Hove, Director of Radiology at Methodist
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of PET scanning expands, the costs of purchasing PET systems are
expected to decline.'te Considering the wide array of clinical appli-
cations for PET scanning and the positive results PET has yielded
thus far, 165 experts predict that PET scanning will be widespread in
the United States within five years.' 66 Even at current costs of ap-
proximately $1,000 per scan,' 67 PET scanning is cost-effective as a
diagnostic test for neocortical death when compared with costs of
$10,000 or more per month to biologically maintain a neocortically
dead patient. 168
IV
MEDICO-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF NEOCORTICAL DEATH
Legal recognition of neocortical death raises numerous issues,
the most intricate of which concerns organ transplants. Although
whole brain dead patients may be biologically maintained for only a
few hours or days, patients declared dead under a neocortical defini-
tion could be biologically maintained for years. 169 Therefore, a ne-
Hospital, Indianapolis, Indiana said,] Methodist hopes to have positron emission tomog-
raphy (PET) scans to look at brain metabolism."); Case Western Medical School to Get PET
Scanner, A.P. News Release, July 17, 1985 ("Medical researchers at Case Western Re-
serve University School of Medicine may soon have a positron emmission [sic] tomogra-
phy (PET) scanner. . . .The PET scanner, which will be housed at University Hospitals
in Cleveland, will be the first in Ohio."); Wagner, Probing the Chemistry of the Mind, 312
NEw ENG.J. MED. 44, 45-46 (1985) ("[It [is] increasingly likely that every major univer-
sity medical center will have a cyclotron and positron tomographic device within the
next 5 to 10 years.").
164 See Cherry & Cherry, supra note 150, at 120; Wagner, supra note 163.
165 See supra notes 149, 150, 151-58 and accompanying text.
166 See supra note 163.
167 According to Dr.Joseph P. Whalen, Chairman of the department of radiology of
New York Hospital, the approximate cost to patients for a PET scan is at least $1,000.
Cherry & Cherry, supra note 150, at 120. See also New Scanner is First to Diagnose Alzheimer's,
Other Brain Disorders, supra note 161 (predicting PET scan costs will soon be $500 to $700
per scan).
168 See supra notes 30 & 133.
169 See supra note 31. Successful transplants require viable, intact organs. Unlike
whole brain dead donors, neocortically dead donors would not be subject to the precari-
ous time clock of a few scant hours or days in which to transplant a kidney, heart, or
lung, for example.
In recognition of the need to improve the system of organ transplantation, the Sec-
retary of Health and Human Services appointed a panel to improve the nation's organ
transplant network pursuant to congressional legislation calling for study and funding of
donor transplant programs. See Panel on Transplants Named, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1985, at
A16, col. 1. See also Sales of Kidneys Increasing As Transplants Proliferate, Am. Med. News,
Nov. 15, 1985, at 18, col. 3 ("The demand for kidneys for transplantation has become so
great that the organs are being sold for up to $13,000."). This task force has considered
several recommendations to advance organ transplantation, including: requiring hospi-
tal staff to ask families of patients who have just died about organ transplantation; en-
couraging cooperation from coroners and medical examiners; accrediting organ-
procurement agencies; and requiring high school courses to treat the subject of dona-
tion. See Legislation to Spur Organ Donations Urged, Am. Med. News, Oct. 18, 1985, at 24,
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ocortical death standard could significantly increase the availability
of viable transplant organs. This raises the possibility that neocorti-
cally dead bodies, or parts thereof, could be donated and main-
tained for long term research, for organ banks, or for other
purposes such as drug testing or manufacturing biochemical
compounds.t 70
The transplant issues in cases involving neocortical death under
the legal death/biological death differentiation advanced in this Ar-
ticle arise only when the patient or patient's family elect not to pre-
serve biological existence because transplantation or other use of a
neocortically dead body is inconsistent with a desire to preserve bio-
logical existence. If the family decides not to maintain biological
existence but to donate the body to science, could scientists or phy-
sicians biologically maintain the body for transplant or research
purposes?
One approach to the problems raised by the potential for keep-
ing a donated neocortically dead body biologically alive for scientific
purposes is simply to maintain the legal status quo. No qualitative
difference exists between the types of procedures, transplants, or
research currently allowed on bodies that have been declared dead
under whole brain standards but that still maintain cardiopulmonary
functions, and the type of research, transplants, and experiments
that would be undertaken on bodies that have been declared dead
under neocortical criteria but that continue to exhibit cardiopulmo-
nary activity.17 1 Consequently, the decedent or relatives could do-
nate the neocortically dead but biologically alive body or body parts
by the procedures and for the purposes set out in the Uniform Ana-
tomical Gift Act. t72 Long-term research or transplant operations
would depend on medical ethics. A neocortical standard merely ex-
tends the time window for action.
A second approach is to recognize the temporal differences be-
col. i; N. Y. Hospitals Required to Ask About Organ Donation, Am. Med. News, Sept. 27, 1985,
at 21, col. 1 (discussing New York law, effective January 1, 1986, which requires hospi-
tals to ask families for organ donations whenever a patient dies). See also New Moy About
Donor Heart Supply, Am. Med. News, Sept. 13, 1985, at 2, col. 4.
170 See Arnold, Neomorts, 54 U. ToRoNro MED. J.35, 37 (1977).
171 In a highly publicized case, 26-year-old Pelle Lindbergh, an all-star goalie for the
Philadelphia Flyers hockey team, was pronounced brain dead under whole brain death
criteria in a New Jersey hospital after suffering massive injuries to his brain and spinal
cord in an automobile accident. Lindbergh, pursuant to his family's wishes, was biologi-
cally maintained on a respirator until his heart, liver, kidneys, pancreas, eyes, and por-
tions of his skin were removed for transplantation. Redefining Death: Technology and
Transplants Complicate Life's Final Certainty, Washington Post, Nov. 20, 1985, Health at 7,
col. 1.
172 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr AcT §§ 3-4, 8A U.L.A. 41 (1983). These purposes in-
clude medical or dental education, research, advancement of medical or dental science,
therapy, or transplantation. Id.
[Vol. 71:850
NEOCORTICAL DEATH
tween neocortical and whole brain death and to make appropriate
law reforms. For example, under a neocortical definition it would
be possible not only to remove the eyes or a kidney from a body that
breathes and has a heartbeat, but also to continue maintaining the
body for years for other transplants or research. This new possibil-
ity may create a need for revising the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act's
transplant procedures. Under current law families or persons who
sign donor cards might not be aware that the corpse could be used
for human experimentation or long term scientific research. There-
fore, in cases involving neocortical death in which the body or parts
thereof were intended for long term research, transplants, or exper-
iments that would not have been possible under whole brain stan-
dards, one possible solution is to forbid third-party donations and
require a written donation document signed by the donating dece-
dent that donates the entire body or relevant organs. Or, more nar-
rowly, the law could require a donation consent form that
specifically included the chronic persistent vegetative state-neocorti-
cal death circumstance. An intermediate position would permit a
family or guardian to make donations for long term maintenance for
transplant or other scientific purposes if the family or guardian were
fully informed of the intended use of the deceased's body or organs,
These approaches assume the ethical propriety, in at least some
circumstances, of biologically maintaining a neocortically dead body
for medical or scientific purposes. 7 3 This ethical issue need not be
finally resolved in order to justify acceptance of a neocortical defini-
tion; if society is not yet ready to seek and accept donations of ne-
ocortically dead bodies for long term biological maintaince for
transplantation or experimentation purposes, we may avoid the
problem simply by treating neocortically dead bodies as we now
treat whole brain donations. Under this approach, biological exist-
ence would be maintained only for limited transplant purposes with
the view toward terminating cardiopulmonary functions following
the transplant procedure.
Giving legal effect to neocortical death does not present any
special legal problems that cannot be resolved with just results.
Under present tort law, a tortfeasor who causes a person to lapse
into an irreversibly noncognitive condition is subject to liability for
personal injuries. 174 Declaring the victim legally dead in this situa-
tion would require no real change in the tort law. The tortfeasor
173 Some commentators question the ethics of such a practice. See H. Jonas, Against
the Stream: Comments in the Definition and Redefinition of Death, in PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS, 37
& n.91 (H.Jonas ed. 1974); D. WALTON, BRAIN DEATH, ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 45, 76
(1980).
174 See, e.g., Hathaway v. Frank, 28 ATLA L. REP. 133 (Maricopa County Sup. Ct.,
Ariz. No. C 503370, Dec. 31, 1984) ($5 million jury verdict for 33-year-old stockbroker
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would be subject to liability for wrongful death under survival and
wrongful death statutes. A court might have to decide the measure
or extent of damages if the patient or family decided to maintain the
neocortically dead body's biological existence. The defendant
might contend that the costs of maintaining the neocortically dead
body are avoidable damages because the law would permit termina-
tion of treatment. Courts should reject this mitigation of damages
theory on the basis of existing tort law. If a patient or family desires
maintenance, requiring the tortfeasor to bear this expense is consis-
tent with both the result under the status quo and the principle that
the tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him.175
A potential scenario in the criminal law context involves the
person who intentionally and wrongfully induces cardiopulmonary
death of a neocortically dead patient who is being biologically sus-
tained pursuant to the wishes of the family or the prior directive of
the decedent. Because the body was already legally dead, the
wrongdoer would not be guilty of manslaughter. 176 The actor
should be liable in tort, however, for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress to surviving family members. Legislation to
impose criminal sanctions for such conduct may also be
appropriate.1 7 7
who became permanently comatose following improper administration of anesthesia
during surgery).
175 See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 292, 458 (5th ed.
1984) (discussing liability for unforeseeable consequences and unreasonable failure to
mitigate damages).
176 An attempted murder charge might be sought if the defendant believed the body
were alive at the time the defendant acted. See United States v. Thomas, 13 U.S.C.M.A.
278, 32 C.M.R. 278 (1962). But see W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW 443-44 (1972)
(criticisms of result in Thomas).
177 For example, in an Illinois case, a father who slammed a severely deformed in-
fant onto the delivery room floor 29 minutes after birth was charged with murder. See
Mistrial in Killing of Malformed Baby Leaves Town Uncertain About Law, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15,
1985, at 9, col. 1. If the child was born with severe brain damage to the point of being
irreversibly unconscious and noncognitive (a fact not capable of proof given the short
time period before the infant was killed), under a neocortical death definition the father
may have committed no crime because the infant was born legally dead although biolog-
ically alive. Under either a neocortical definition of death or under the right of pri-
vacy/right to die cases, the parents had the option of terminating biologic existence. See,
e.g., In re L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E.2d 716 (1984) (approving termination of life-
support systems for infant born irreversibly noncognitive and unconscious). Unlike dis-
connecting life-support machines or nourishment systems and unlike active termination
by chemical injection, however, the father's acts in this case may well call for criminal
sanctions, even if the infant's parents would have sought withdrawal of treatment and
cessation of food and water. For example, his conduct may be considered an "abuse of
corpse." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.10(a)(1) (Vernon 1974) ("A person commits an
offense if, not authorized by law, he intentionally or knowingly. . . treats in a seriously
offensive manner a human corpse.").
A recent Florida case further illustrates how a neocortical definition of death would
avert the current application of homicide laws to cases that involve terminating the bio-
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A neocortical definition of legal death would also affect insur-
ance law. At present, irreversibly unconscious noncognitive pa-
tients continue to receive health insurance and disability benefits 178
but do not receive death benefits under life or accidental death in-
surance policies. 179 Under a new legal definition of death that in-
corporated neocortical death, the opposite results would occur
because the insured would be legally dead. Beneficiaries would re-
ceive life and accidental death benefits, but insurance companies
would not be obliged to pay health or disability benefits under cur-
rent policies. If the law recognized neocortical death but reserved
the right to keep the body biologically alive, insurance companies
would be likely to rewrite or offer new health insurance policies pro-
viding coverage for the costs of post-neocortical death biological
maintenance.
A potential conflict may arise between the wishes of the dece-
dent's heirs or devisees and the decedent's documented desire to be
maintained biologically. Suppose that while competent the dece-
dent wrote a "living will" expressing his desire to be kept on life-
support systems in the event of an irreversible loss of cognitive
functions. The decedent's heirs or beneficiaries might contend,
however, that maintaining a dead body constitutes a "waste" of the
estate's assets. In this situation, the decedent's directive should
control. Although under present law deceased persons' directives
concerning disposition of their bodies are treated only with "benev-
olent discretion" by courts,180 a directive to maintain biological life
is materially different from a request to be buried with "all my
diamonds, stock and sterling silver." 18 1 In sum, the legal nuances
that may arise if the law sanctions neocortical death do not appear
to be serious or incapable of fair resolution.
CONCLUSION
The current legal treatment of brain death is both anomalous
logical existence of a neocortically dead body. A 25-year-old father had shot and killed
his three-year-old daughter who, as a result of a freakish accident involving a reclining
chair, was irreversibly unconscious and noncognitive. The father received a mandatory
25-year sentence. See Comatose Toddler Shot to Death; Heartsick Father Turns Himself In, N.Y.
Times, June 30, 1985, at 18, col. 5.
178 See In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (health insurance);
Mack v. City of Minneapolis, 333 N.W.2d 744, 746 (Minn. 1983) (disability benefits). See
also supra note 95.
179 Douglas v. Southwestern Life Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 788, 791 (Tex. Civ. App.
1964) (life insurance-accidental death benefits).
180 J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, FAMILY WEALTH TRANSACTIONS, WILLS, TRUSTS
AND ESTATES 409 (1978).
181 See Merkrus Estate, 24 Pa. Fiduc. 249 (Orphans' Ct. 1974) (such bequest held
against public policy).
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and unsound. Present law is grossly inconsistent: it upholds surro-
gate decisions to terminate life-support systems and nourishment
when incompetent patients irreversibly lose all consciousness and
cognitive functions, yet it fails to recognize neocortical death. If so-
ciety accepts sentencing death to the irreversibly noncognitive-and
there is a growing medical, legal, and public consensus to do so-
then it is logical, just, and humane to treat the irreversible loss of
higher brain functions as legal death, reserving the right of the pa-
tient or the patient's family to maintain biological existence. Includ-
ing neocortical death within the law's definition of death ensures
that the consequences and rights flowing from whole brain and
cardiopulmonary death will also attend neocortical death.
Distinguishing legal from biological death profoundly alters the
moral and legal dilemmas in "tragic choice" cases. When physicians
determine that a person has irreversibly lost all those cerebral quali-
ties that distinguish human life, artificial life-support systems and
nourishment may be terminated because the patient is legally dead.
Relatives, guardians, and physicians will not be forced to obtain ju-
dicial approval to terminate nourishment or cardiorespiratory sup-
port regimens. Families will not be compelled to end the biological
existence of a family member in order to achieve the financial and
legal results that follow a determination of death. In neocortical
brain death cases guardians, families, and courts would no longer be
required to engage in a will-o'-the wisp endeavor to discover what
unconscious patients thought about death or would have thought
about death even if they had never thought about it or had been
incapable of thinking at all. No longer will the law favor artificially
maintaining someone in an inhuman state. T. S. Eliot captured the
essential point in the epigraph from Petronius's Satyricon which ap-
pears at the beginning of The Wasteland. After granting the Sibyl of
Cumae the gift of eternal life, Apollo does not grant her eternal
youth, and consequently her body shrivels up until she lives in a
bottle:
For I saw with my own eyes the Sibyl hanging in a jar at Cumae,
and when the acolytes said, "Sibyl what do you wish?" she replied,
"I wish to die."' 18 2
182 T.S. Eliot, The Wasteland, in THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF MODERN POETRY 459 (R.
Ellman & R. O'Clair eds. 1973).
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